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List of Abbreviations and Acronyms 
 
ISAF – International Security Assistance Force 
 
ANSF – Afghan National Security Forces 
 
UNAMA – United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan 
 
SNTV – Single Non-Transferable Vote 
 
ECC – Electoral Complaints Commission  
 
IEC – Independent Election Commission  
 
FATA – Federally Administered Tribal Areas 
 
ISI – Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence  
 
NSS – National Security Strategy  
 
IED – Improvised Explosive Device 
 
ISIS – Islamic State of Iraq and Syria  
 
CEO – Chief Executive Officer 
 
NATO – North American Treaty Organization   
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General Timeline1  
 
1919 – Amanullah Khan declares Afghan independence from British Influence. 
 
1979 – Soviet Army invades to support the communist government of Afghanistan. 
 
1980 – U.S., Pakistan, China, Iran, & Saudi Arabia supply money and weapons to  
mujahedeen. 
 
1988 – Geneva Accords signed by Afghanistan, U.S., Soviets, and Pakistan; Soviet  
troops begin withdrawal. 
 
1989 – Civil war continues between mujahedeen and the Najibullah regime. 
 
1996 – Taliban gains control of Kabul, introduces a strict Islamic government. 
 
1997 – Pakistan and Saudi Arabia recognize the Taliban government. 
 
1998 – Osama bin Laden bombs two U.S. embassies in Africa; U.S. retaliates against 
Afghanistan with missile strikes. 
 
2001 – Terrorist attacks on the U.S.; U.S. launches war on Afghanistan; in December, the  
Taliban falls and the Bonn Accords are agreed to; Hamid Karzai sworn in as president 
of interim government. 
 
2002 – First deployment of ISAF in Afghanistan; Karzai elected head of transitional  
government. 
 
2004 – New constitution adopted; Karzai elected to first term as president. 
 
2005 – Parliamentary elections held for first time in thirty years. 
 
2008 – Barack Obama elected President of the United States. 
 
2009 – Surge of U.S. troops in Afghanistan begins; Karzai elected to second term. 
 
2010 – Second parliamentary elections held. 
 
2012 – NATO announces plan to withdraw foreign combat troops by end of 2014.  
 
2013 – Afghan Army takes command of all military and security operations. 
 
2014 – Ashraf Ghani elected president, Abdullah Abdullah elected as first chief executive  
officer; NATO formally ends combat missions in Afghanistan. 
 








For nearly a century, the United States has attempted to influence countries abroad, 
hoping to create democratic governments where they do not already exist. Whether or not 
these attempts have been successful, the U.S. continues to pursue the ideal of democracy, 
particularly in post-conflict regions or in countries suffering from ongoing conflict. This is no 
different in Afghanistan. In response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York and 
Washington, D.C., the U.S. launched the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan with the goal of 
eradicating both al Qaeda and the Taliban. After a swift military victory, the U.S., its allies, 
and Afghanistan signed the Bonn Agreement, establishing guidelines to create a new 
representative, democratic government that would hopefully flourish in the following years. 
However, thirteen years later, the region is still fraught with violence and corruption, and 
democracy is far from legitimate or functioning. This should inspire U.S. policymakers to 
look deeper into why democracy has not found a welcoming home in Afghanistan—is it 
Afghanistan, its troublesome history, its ethnic divides, and its recurring flirtation with 
terrorism, or is it a failure on the part of the U.S. and its allies?  
In order to answer this question, my thesis will first explain how democracy 
promotion came to be such a prominent aspect of American foreign policy, how it has 
morphed through time, and how effective it has been in different countries and situations. 
After describing the history of democratization, both in general and in Afghanistan, my thesis 
will move to describe and analyze the various impediments to Afghan democracy that are 
currently in place. By listing and explaining what has been responsible for undermining 
democracy in Afghanistan, the reader will then be able to understand if there are any possible 
solutions that could remove or circumvent these impediments, and whether or not the United 
States and its allies can be involved in such solutions. Finally, this paper will discuss the past 
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attempts at democracy implementation in Afghanistan since the enactment of the Bonn 
Agreement and detail the successes and failures of these efforts. Essentially, it is clear that 
these three elements come together to explain that even a massive U.S. and allied effort is not 
enough to simultaneously stem the tide of Taliban insurgency, overcome a history of 
instability and entrenched ethnic divides, and successfully complete reconstruction efforts. 
However, there is a chance that, in the distant future, the general population of Afghanistan 
could rise up against the Taliban, against the warlords corrupting the government, and 
against poverty and illiteracy so that the country can move toward an organic democracy, 
with the terms, pace, and structure dictated by the Afghan citizens. 
Answering these questions is extremely important for future U.S. policy in post-
conflict and ongoing-conflict regions. In looking back on the widely perceived failure of the 
American mission in Afghanistan, hindsight has been 20/20, allowing both informed and 
uninformed audiences to criticize U.S. actions in the country. No new conclusions about the 
efforts in Afghanistan will allow the United States to turn back time and change the strategy 
it adopted. However, by reanalyzing the effectiveness of U.S. tactics in Afghanistan, 
policymakers, political advisors, and military leaders will hopefully better understand where 
the mission went wrong and how such efforts can be improved for future cases. Perhaps such 
research will go so far as to change American views on imposing democracies in other 
countries, whether it is in regards to the implementation process specifically or to the concept 
of democratization as a foreign policy in general. Additionally, the amount of money, 
resources, and lives lost in Afghanistan in the pursuit of democracy should further elevate the 
importance of studying this conflict. In order to prevent such high costs in future foreign 
policy actions, the U.S. must learn from these experiences in Afghanistan by analyzing what 
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has worked and why, what has failed and why, and how these lessons can be adapted and 
utilized in future foreign relations.  
 
BACKGROUND: SETTING THE STAGE  
 
Before discussing democracy promotion as an American policy, it is useful to 
introduce a brief history of Afghan politics. Afghanistan, a country geographically smaller 
than Texas, is home to nearly 30 million people, contains an ever-elusive enemy, is forced to 
deal with shifting tribal dynamics, and resides in a rough neighborhood of countries that 
frequently threaten both regional and global stability.2 Historically, the country has suffered 
seemingly endless fighting and instability, with surrounding countries and empires repeatedly 
struggling for control of the region. In the past half-century, Afghanistan has only ever 
known war—the Afghan-Soviet War ended in 1989, only to be replaced by a civil war, then a 
war against the Taliban, followed by a war waged by the Taliban and al Qaeda against the 
Northern Alliance, and finally the 2001 U.S. invasion of Afghanistan that is still plaguing the 
country today.3  Ongoing conflict has inflamed the already present issues of illiteracy, 
poverty, lack of urbanization and infrastructure, and ethnic divides. Afghanistan, consistently 
ranked in the bottom ten of the United Nation’s Development Index, currently sees a life 
expectancy of 50 years, only 25% of the population lives in urban areas, nearly half of the 
populace is under 15 years old, the rate of infant mortality is the highest in the world, and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 Collins, Joseph J. Understanding War in Afghanistan. Washington, DC: National Defense 
University Press, 2011. Print. 
3 Ibid.  
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only about 28% of the country is literate.4 In conditions like these, democracy is not just 
unrealistic, but almost unimaginable. 
Understanding Afghanistan’s political history is integral to comprehending exactly 
how the country remains such a poor, underdeveloped nation. In 1747, Ahmad Shah Durrani 
brought the Pashtun tribes together to establish Afghanistan as a unified country. Although 
Afghanistan was then considered an official state, the country did not win independence from 
British control until 1919 with the Treaty of Rawalpindi.5 Leading up to that, the British East 
India Company utilized Afghanistan as a buffer country to protect India from a Russian 
invasion, which eventually lead to the First Anglo-Afghan War in 1839. A few decades later, 
the Second Anglo-Afghan War culminated in a British victory, and Afghanistan was forced 
to cede both some frontier territory and control of its foreign relations to the British.6  
Finally, King Amanullah Khan ignited the Third Anglo-Afghan War when he invaded British 
East India in hopes of maintaining his newly seized hold on power. This war established 
Afghanistan’s full sovereignty in foreign affairs, finally allowing it to be a completely 
independent country.7 The following period of Amanullah’s rule saw the establishment of 
diplomatic relations with most major countries, which included accepting foreign aid from 
the Soviet Union. Amanullah also modernized Afghanistan by opening up coed schools and 
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4 "Afghanistan." CIA: The World Factbook. June 24, 2014. 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html.  
5 Katzman, Kenneth. "Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy." 
Congressional Research Service. January 4, 2013. 
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/202879.pdf. Pg. 1. 
6 "The First Anglo-Afghan War, 1839-1842." Military History Monthly. October 1, 2010. Accessed 
October 1, 2014. http://www.military-history.org/articles/the-first-anglo-afghan-war-1839-1842.htm.  




ending the tradition of constant veiling for women; however, modernization was met with 
serious opposition, and the king was forced to abdicate his throne in 1929.8  
After much back-and-forth conflict, King Nadir Shah replaced Amanullah. 
Afghanistan was extremely turbulent throughout this period though, and the new king was 
assassinated only four years after his installment. King Shah’s 19-year old son succeeded the 
throne and ruled until 1973, when he was dethroned by a coup.9 Prime Minister Daoud then 
took power, declared Afghanistan a republic, and named himself president. His attempts at 
social and fiscal reform had little success though, and he was ousted and killed in yet another 
coup in 1978. This coup established an extremely harsh Marxist government, which quickly 
spurred a revolt by the Afghan people.10 The Soviet Union then invaded Afghanistan in 1979 
to support the struggling Afghan Marxists. This sparked a long, destructive war, with the 
Soviet Union fighting alongside the Marxist regime and the United States aiding the 
mujahedeen and other rebel forces trying to overthrow the communists. After severe 
casualties on both sides, the Soviets finally withdrew in 1989 in accordance with the Geneva 
Accords.11  
Despite the agreement made in the Geneva Accords, peace was still not achieved in 
Afghanistan. Because the mujahedeen had been excluded from the agreements, they refused 
to accept the Geneva Accords; thus, civil war continued to flare despite Soviet withdrawal.12 
The Taliban had gained support by assuring the Afghan people that, if they took back Kabul, 
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8 Emadi, Hafizullah. Repression, Resistance, and Women in Afghanistan. Westport, CT: Praeger, 
2002. Pg. 69. 
9 Katzman, Kenneth. January 4, 2013. Pg. 2. 
10 Ibid.  
11 Ibid. Pg. 3.  




they would end the lawlessness and restore Afghanistan’s religious values. Finally, Kabul fell 
to the Taliban in 1996, and they took control of nearly 90 percent of the country, exercising 
power over every region except the Panjshir Valley.13 The emergence of the Taliban 
government surprisingly brought about some stability in the region after twenty years of 
ongoing conflict; however, only three countries recognized the Taliban as the legitimate 
government, and any sort of past success in the areas of women’s rights or religious freedom 
was reversed.14  
The Taliban implemented strict Sharia jurisprudence in Afghanistan. Women had to 
be fully veiled in public at all times, were no longer allowed to work, could not leave the 
house alone, or even wear white socks. Men were forced to grow beards the length of their 
fists, and buzkashi, the national sport, was outlawed. Human rights violations were rampant 
throughout the country.15 During the Taliban’s reign, Osama bin Laden was able to settle in 
the country, where he remained hidden from the U.S. and the Northern Alliance for years.  
In October 2001, after the September 11 attacks and the Taliban’s refusal to hand 
over bin Laden, the United States launched Operation Enduring Freedom, beginning aerial 
attacks on Afghanistan.16 The sole mission of this operation was to destroy the Taliban and al 
Qaeda; however, this quickly shifted as the United States realized some nation building 
would be necessary to create a bulwark against future revivals and regenerations of the 
terrorist group.  
This subsequently committed the U.S. to democratizing Afghanistan, which has thus 
far been relatively unsuccessful; the current state of operations begs the question, can the 
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13 Collins, Joseph J. 
14 Reynolds, Andrew. Class PowerPoint. POLI 130: Comparative Politics. February 20, 2013.  
15 Ibid. 
16 Katzman, Kenneth. January 4, 2013. Pg. 8. 
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U.S. and its allies impose Western-style democracy on Afghanistan, considering its chaotic 
past, its horrific quality of life, a continued Taliban presence, and secret duplicitous 
interference from neighboring countries? I will argue that democracy cannot be imposed on 
Afghanistan by the U.S.—a Western nation viewed by much of the population as an 
occupying force—while the U.S. simultaneously tries to fight off the Taliban and reconstruct 
vital societal institutions. Instead, it is important to formulate the best possible strategy for 






































 The Bush Doctrine shaped American intervention in Afghanistan following the 
attacks of September 11, 2001. This doctrine employed democracy promotion through 
military and political power as its key policy to combat the spread of terrorism and protect 
U.S. political and security interests. The mission in Afghanistan, along with a similar one in 
Iraq, may be the most prominent and memorable examples of democracy promotion for 
current generations; however, the Bush Doctrine is but a culmination of past policies and 
theories regarding democracy promotion and implementation. Since the birth of the United 
States, American nationalism has been both an extremely strong rallying point and also an 
inspiration for diplomacy and policy. The particular notion of having an obligation to share 
and spread America’s beloved liberal democratic ideals to other countries prompted the 
adoption of democratization to U.S. foreign policy early on in the country’s history and has 
allowed for its continued use in crafting foreign policy today.17  
In the American foreign policy world, there are various interpretations and analyses 
of democracy promotion. Jonathan Monten’s explanation that it first began as a policy of 
exemplarism, but eventually transformed into vindicationism is useful in this regard. 
Exemplarism suggests that the U.S. should lead only by example, focusing inward to 
improve and perfect its own democracy as a model for other countries to imitate. Conversely, 
vindicationism says that the United States should not operate solely as a model, but also as a 
crusader for democracy by using political and military power as tools to democratize other 
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17 Monten, Jonathan. "The Roots of the Bush Doctrine: Power, Nationalism, and Democracy 
Promotion in U.S. Strategy." International Security 29.4 (2005): 112-56. Pg. 113. 
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countries.18 These perspectives stem from the widespread belief in American liberal 
exceptionalism, which says that U.S. power is the singular beacon upholding a liberal world 
order. Alexis de Tocqueville is credited with developing this idea in Democracy in America, 
in which he labels the American experience “exceptional” because of the absence of class 
and religious strife, its geographic isolation from European turmoil, and its principle that 
people are born equal.19 While the etymology and existence of this phrase before World War 
II are widely debated, it is undoubted that the feelings and principles attributed to it inspired 
America’s platform of democracy promotion.20 But, each theory calls for a different strategy 
in order to achieve the goal of spreading democracy, freedom, liberalism, and a free market 
across the globe. While versions of exemplarism and vindictationism have coexisted 
throughout much of U.S. history, it is generally accepted that democracy promotion began on 
the principle of isolationism and exemplarism and has evolved into a more unilateral, 
vindicationist principle.21  
 
Exemplarism History & Definition 
 
 The principle of exemplarism as a method of democracy promotion can best be 
understood as the embodiment of John Winthrop’s Puritan “city on a hill” ideal from 1630. 
While Winthrop was referring to making the territory that was to become the Massachusetts 
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18 Monten, Jonathan. Pg. 113 – 114. 
19 Hill, Matthew Alan. Democracy Promotion and Conflict-based Reconstruction: the United States 
and Democratic Consolidation in Bosnia, Afghanistan and Iraq. New York: Routledge, 2011. Print. 
20 Caesar, James W. "The Origins and Character of American Exceptionalism." American Political 
Thought: A Journal of Ideas, Institutions, and Culture 1 (2012): 1-24. The Jack Miller Center, 2012. 
Web.  
21 Monten, Jonathan. Pg. 114. 
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Bay Colony into a utopia and beacon for people all over the world to admire and envy, the 
same basic principle is applied in U.S. exemplarism.22  
According to Jonathan Monten, exemplarism dictates that, “The United States should 
focus on perfecting its own domestic political and social order, and close the gap between the 
ideals of the American Creed and the actual performance of U.S. political institutions.”23 
This principle calls for the United States to turn inward, to focus on personal growth and 
improvement, to choose a path of isolation from the rest of the world, instead of interfering 
with other nations’ sovereignty.  Instead, the U.S. must improve its own institutions, 
strengthen its economy through free market ideals, and ensure individual liberties.24 The 
United States cannot attempt to successfully impose democracy abroad when democracy at 
home isn’t fully functioning and at its best, otherwise U.S. actions will rightly be labeled as 
hypocritical. 
 This concept of leading by example should have been expected of the U.S. in its early 
years. Before America was the sole hegemon in the world order, when it was still a fledgling 
nation without great military might or political power, there was no way for the country to 
project its interests or liberal ideals abroad. Instead, for a weak United States, it made much 
more sense to turn inward and focus on self-improvement.25 But, that is not the only reason 
that exemplarism dominated early on in the U.S.  
The new citizens of America needed to focus internally, to work on nation building, 
and to create the necessary institutions for the fledgling nation to survive and thrive. The last 
thing the U.S. needed to do was to get entangled in ongoing Old World problems. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 Monten, Jonathan. Pg. 121. 
23 Ibid. Pg. 124. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. Pg. 134.  
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Furthermore, America’s early leaders quickly gravitated towards isolationism once they 
realized just how injurious a vindicationism-centered policy seeking liberalism abroad could 
be to liberalism at home.26  
Monten identifies this paradox, citing that the very institutions the U.S. would need to 
promote and implement liberalism in other countries “[undermine] the attraction of the U.S. 
example.”27 Early leaders, such as George Washington and John Adams, understood the 
“inherent fragility” of their newly created liberal American institutions.28 The U.S. polity was 
not guaranteed to succeed, but instead was thought of as an experiment in liberalism and 
democracy that had the potential to fail. The possibility of failure would only be exacerbated 
if the U.S. stretched its power too thin through unilateral democracy promotion. Finally, U.S. 
leaders were skeptical of the American capacity to produce liberal change across the globe.29 
This skepticism was further reinforced by the study of classic democracies and democratic 
missions that had failed: Athens, the Roman Republic, France, and Latin America. Each of 
these failed examples brought about doubt in the level of potential U.S. influence abroad.30 
Leaders at this time saw the American Revolution as a precedent of unforeseen success, in 
which revolutionaries had achieved moral influence through sheer force of their example. 
Their success had finally elevated the cause of liberalism to a status and dignity it had never 




26 Monten, Jonathan. Pg. 124. 
27 Ibid.  
28 Ibid. Pg. 130. 
29 Ibid. Pg. 154. 
30 Ibid. Pg. 130 – 131.  
31 Ibid. Pg. 129. 
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Shift to Vindicationism 
 
However, as the United States grew in stature, strength, and power, the driving 
principles behind its foreign policy began to shift away from exemplarism. The first flirtation 
with forcible democratization was a result of the rising American belief in Manifest 
Destiny—the U.S. was “destined, ordained by God, to occupy the North American 
continent.”32 Critics have designated this a simple justification for American imperialism and 
Westward expansion, which resulted in the spread of American diplomacy and democracy 
promotion abroad.33 The ideals behind American Manifest Destiny were transformed into an 
international policy in the 1890’s in the Spanish-American War and the subsequent attempt 
to democratize the Philippines. After a swift defeat of the Spanish in 1898, U.S. attitudes 
toward foreign intervention began to gradually change from non-interventionist to 
vindicationist with the American acquisition of the Philippines.34 Fighting broke out between 
American forces and Filipino nationalists on February 4, 1899, two days before the Treaty of 
Paris, in which Spain relinquished control of the Philippines to the U.S., was to be ratified.35 
Emilio Aguinaldo led the Filipino nationalists first in a conventional war and then in a 
guerrilla campaign to achieve total independence. Depending on which side you ask, these 
clashes grew into either the Philippine-American War or into a severe Filipino insurrection. 
Either way, this conflict inflicted enormous losses on both the Americans and the Filipinos 
and set the precedent for future U.S. intervention abroad.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32 Sauers, Richard. "Manifest Destiny." Guide to U.S. Foreign Policy: A Diplomatic History. Ed. 
Robert J. McMahon, and Thomas W. Zeiler. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, Inc., 2012. 19-
37. SAGE knowledge. Web. 11 Dec. 2014. 
33 Ibid.  
34 Worley, D. Robert. "American Exceptionalism and Other Isms." The Huffington Post. HPMG 
News, 04 Oct. 2012. Web. 8 Oct. 2014. 
35 "The Philippine-American War." Office of the Historian. U.S. Department of State. Web. 12 Oct. 
2014. 
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Annexation of the Philippines was but an example of growing U.S. military and 
political power, which rationally led to the desire for more power and influence abroad, 
whether that was through intervention or acquisition of new territories. However, because the 
foundation of intervention is almost entirely contradictory to the liberal principles America 
defines itself by, the U.S. “had no choice thereafter but to govern [the Philippines] with a 
serious commitment to the island’s democratization.”36 This largely created the vindicationist 
model by which the United States operated in other foreign interventions in the future, 
including World War II.  
 There are numerous explanations for the shift from the principle of exemplarism to 
that of vindicationism in U.S. foreign policy at the turn of the 19th Century. By the 1890s, the 
United States had increased its military capabilities by building a modern navy, developing a 
strong trained fighting force, and establishing major industrial power to create an increased 
supply of military equipment.37 The Civil War had ended decades ago, and the United States 
had finally established itself as a major world power. This increase in political and military 
influence and strength finally granted the U.S. the necessary capabilities to project its 
political interests abroad. In line with the realist explanation of foreign policy, this increase in 
relative U.S. power subsequently increased the magnitude of its political interests abroad.38  
Now that the United States was strong enough to exert its influence on other 
countries, it had a stronger desire to do just that. The United States was now part of a security 
dilemma, which dictated that failure of the U.S. to expand its security and political position 
in its own hemisphere would leave a vacuum for other powers to interfere.39 In response to 
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36 Monten, Jonathan. Pg. 135.  
37 Ibid. Pg. 132. 
38 Ibid. Pg. 142. 
39 Ibid. Pg. 134. 
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this fear, Theodore Roosevelt added his own corollary to the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, in 
which Monroe protected the liberal right to self-determination by declaring that European 
interference in North or South America would be viewed as acts of aggression requiring U.S. 
intervention.  
The 1904 Roosevelt Corollary built upon this, declaring that the U.S. had authority to 
use offensive force against both Old World powers interfering in the West, as well as against 
the governments of the New World that the U.S. didn't deem legitimate.40,41 Woodrow 
Wilson expanded this throughout his presidency, particularly in the Fourteen Points he 
delivered to Congress. Through these points, Wilson declared the U.S. mission “is to 
vindicate the principles of peace and justice,” by “affording guarantees of political 
independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike.”42,43 This essentially 
established the United States as the “international police power” in the Western Hemisphere, 
marking an evident shift toward vindicationism that would continue throughout the rest of 
the 20th Century and into the 21st.44  
 However, increased global power was not the sole factor responsible for the grand 
strategic change in U.S. foreign policy. Various scholars and leaders gave responsibility for 
this shift to new “geopolitical interest, commercial expansion, social and cultural change, 
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40 Hill, Matthew Alan.  
41 "Monroe Doctrine." Office of the Historian. U.S. Department of State. Web. 12 Oct. 2014. 
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1801-1829/monroe. 
42 “Wilson’s Fourteen Points, 1918.” Office of the Historian. U.S. Department of State. Web. 18 Nov. 
2014. https://history.state.gov/milestones/1914-1920/fourteen-points. 
43 "President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points." The Avalon Project. Yale Law School. 6 Dec. 
2014. 
44 "Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, 1904." Office of the Historian. U.S. Department of 
State. Web. 12 Oct. 2014. https://history.state.gov/milestones/1899-1913/roosevelt-and-monroe-
doctrine. 
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bureaucratic and institutional politics, and shifting regional alignment.”45 While these are all 
important influences on both American foreign and domestic policies, they ignore one of the 
most important factors that dictates U.S. policy: ideology. During the decades between the 
Civil War and World War I, the United States experienced material growth, economic 
expansion, and political prominence.  
The Progressive Movement grew out of this, developing in response to the 
urbanization and industrialization of society following the Civil War. Its general motives 
were to restore the basic principles of liberalism that the U.S. was founded on: “economic 
individualism, political democracy, and civic purity.”46 Most Progressives tended to support 
an activist foreign policy that found its home in the principles of vindicationism. Unlike the 
supporters of exemplarism, the Progressives called for a combination of reforming American 
institutions at home while also trying to spread democracy abroad.47 This was largely 
influenced by their belief in the U.S. government’s ability to expedite democratic progress 
through positive direct action and involvement in the affairs of other countries. Now, 
progress could be seen as less of an inevitable passive process, and more so as an active U.S. 
policy to create what it called a “more perfect social and political order,” particularly 
considering the acceptance of the theory that democracies do not fight one another.48  
As Progressivism grew to be a prominent ideological movement in the U.S., the 
Social Gospel also rose to popularity. These two movements complemented each other in 
their mutual belief in the U.S. capacity to effect positive change and develop an improved 
society. The Social Gospel reinforced vindicationism by not only arguing for both individual 
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45 Monten, Jonathan. Pg. 132. 
46 Ibid. Pg. 135. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. Pg. 115. 
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and societal reform, but also by reasserting that the U.S. had the power and influence to bring 
about positive, progressive reform within and outside of its borders.49 In contrast to the 
founding fathers’ argument that interest is the governing principle in every society, and thus 
every society is selfish, the Social Gospel saw U.S. power as both “virtuous and benign”.50 
Instead of acting out of self-interest, which could never in turn be in the best interest of 
another country, the Social Gospel saw the U.S. operating as “custodians of the spirit of 
righteousness,” with the God-given mission of regenerating the rest of the world.51 This 
trifecta of factors allowed for a relatively swift shift from exemplarism to vindicationism that 
was received as relatively palatable, if not necessary and vital to both the U.S. and struggling 
nations. 
 
Vindicationism History & Definition 
 
 Where exemplarism posited the United States as a beacon for democracy, 
vindicationism advocated for the U.S. to act as a crusader, or even an evangelist, in 
promoting democracy in other countries. This principle viewed Americans as a missionary 
people attempting to expand into foreign territories and transform the rest of the world.52 
Rather than leading by example, the U.S. must utilize its newfound power to “‘vindicate the 
right’ in an otherwise illiberal world.”53 When simply trying to lead by example, American 
democracy promotion had no attachment to a particular style of democracy, so long as it 
promoted liberty and equality; however, the switch to a vindicationist policy resulted in 
adopting the American Mission, which sought to impose Western-style democracies with 
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49 Monten, Jonathan, Pg. 144.  
50 Ibid. Pg. 137. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. Pg. 114. 
53 Ibid. Pg. 125. 
22 
Western values and Western institutions on non-Western countries.54 While vindicationism 
was seemingly impossible in the first century of the United States’ existence—the nation was 
too weak and too introspective—rising U.S. power in the late 1800s and early 1900s allowed 
for a more assertive and forceful foreign policy.55  
Advocates of this principle of democracy promotion saw exemplarism as inefficient 
and believed the process of democratization should be expedited via foreign intervention or 
military force if necessary.56 This school of thought generally rejected the idea of territorial 
sovereignty or self-determination in favor of the belief that America could best serve the rest 
of the world by intervening forcefully to spread democracy. A huge aspect of vindicationism 
is that its proponents were far more confident in the quality of American democracy and far 
less concerned about the potential for the U.S. to abuse its power. In their view, U.S. 
institutions are superior to the governments of other nations, and thus much more fit for 
exportation. Vindicationists believed U.S. leaders were (and are) largely committed to the 
liberal-democratic values of this nation and that the U.S. political system imposes checks and 
balances that keep individual leaders and branches of the government from becoming corrupt 
or too preponderant. Thus, if any country is going to promote democracy abroad, the United 
States is the best candidate for the job.57   
The prominence of Progressivism and the Social Gospel granted the mission of 
democratization a religious fervor that appealed to a large array of Americans. Albert 
Beveridge, a leading member of the Progressive Movement, saw democracy promotion as a 
religious mission to be conducted in the name of God: “God has marked the American 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
54 Hill, Matthew Alan.  
55 Monten, Jonathan. Pg. 134. 
56 Ibid. Pg. 125. 
57 Ibid. Pg. 126. 
23 
people as His chosen Nation to finally lead in the regeneration of the world.”58 This manner 
of thinking found a permissive environment in 20th century America, where the U.S. could 
pursue a forceful foreign policy regarding democracy promotion, as a result of the increasing 
unipolarity of a world in which the United States was becoming the sole hegemon.  
 
The Bush Doctrine & Afghanistan 
 
 Vindicationism thus prevailed over exemplarism throughout the rest of the 20th 
century, culminating and climaxing in the Bush Doctrine of combatting unfriendly, 
dangerous, and repressive regimes by actively and coercively expanding democracy across 
the globe.59 The 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS), released on September 17, 2002, 
announced how President George W. Bush would conduct such a foreign policy and manage 
the War on Terror:  
“We fight, as we always fight, for a just peace—a peace that favors liberty. We will defend 
the peace against the threats from terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by 
building good relations among the great powers. And we will extend the peace by 
encouraging free and open societies on every continent.”60 
 
As part of the War on Terror, President George W. Bush adopted this policy with two 
assumptions in mind: first, that eradicating a repressive leader would immediately lead to that 
country’s population rising up in support of a liberal democracy; and, two, that democracy is 
a natural bulwark against terrorism. With these two assumptions, the Taliban and al Qaeda 
were the obvious targets and Afghanistan would be the primary battleground. The NSS 
defined the U.S. mission to combat these targets, saying:  
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“We will build defenses against ballistic missiles and other means of delivery. We will 
cooperate with other nations to deny, contain, and curtail our enemies’ efforts to acquire 
dangerous technologies. And, as a matter of common sense and self-defense, America will 
act against such emerging threats before they are fully formed.”61 
 
This established the Bush Doctrine as a foreign policy relying on preemptive action to deal 
with terrorist organizations with global reach, weak states that harbored or sponsored terrorist 
groups, and rogue states that did not abide by international laws or treaties.62 Furthermore, 
this strategy of preemption foresaw global terrorism as an imminent threat, a threat that was 
constantly growing, evolving, and morphing, a threat that could not be deterred, and a threat 
that could potentially destroy the United States. In the face of such an unprecedented threat to 
its ideals and existence, the U.S. needed to develop an equally unprecedented response to 
eradicate these threats.  
 The strategy that President Bush developed and employed was not shiny or new, but 
instead grew out of past neoliberal and vindicationist foreign policy principles. The Bush 
Administration believed in the American capacity to effect change abroad, particularly by 
influencing the policies and politics of domestic institutions in threatening states.63 This was 
in line with previous administrations and leaders, who hoped to expand liberal-democratic 
ideals throughout the world and who believed in the benevolence of U.S. intervention and 
power. However, Bush put these beliefs into action with an unforeseen vehemence and 
aggression. Bush’s vindicationism utilized power, coercion, and even military force as its 
primary tools for exporting democracy. This was possible due to the increasing unipolarity of 
the world, which was a result of growing U.S. relative power, combined with the nature of 
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U.S. nationalism, which was broadly optimistic about American intentions and had been 
seriously amplified in response to 9/11.64  
By the millennium, the United States had surpassed all other nations in power, 
economic capacity, and military capabilities. This overall dominance granted the U.S. the 
ability to project its power abroad, influencing governments and international institutions 
more than any country has done in the past. In addition to this, U.S. nationalism at this time 
operated on the belief that the United States is and should act as a force for democracy, 
especially considering that the U.S. is the, “single sustainable model for national success: 
freedom, democracy, and free enterprise.”65  This has subsequently linked American identity 
with the policy of democracy promotion, ensuring that it will play some role in foreign policy 
for years, if not decades, to come. But, reality has not lived up to the United States’ “bold 
proclamations” that democracy is desired and attainable by all and that it will create peace 
and stability worldwide.66  
 The Bush Administration’s implementation of a vindicationist foreign policy was 
defined by three core principles, all of which have been used in the past to explain the rise 
and continuity of U.S. vindicationism.67 The first of these principles is the belief in the 
possibility of liberal political change throughout the world. The Bush Administration adhered 
to the belief that democracy is a spontaneous and natural form of government that would 
exist in practically every country if there were no artificial obstacles, such as a repressive 
minority or a group of self-serving elites.68 President Bush wanted to wrangle U.S. power to 
create “conditions in which all nations and all societies can choose for themselves the 
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rewards and challenges of political and economic liberty.”69 Because the Bush 
Administration believed in the universality and exportability of U.S. political values and 
institutions—namely liberal market economics and representative democracy—the president 
and some of his advisers assumed that a military victory would equate democratization; 
however, this failed to distinguish between liberation and democratization, two processes that 
are inherently different and require specific policies and strategies.70 Furthermore, the Bush 
Administration also assumed that all societies, populations, and countries want a democratic 
government, which is not necessarily the case. 
The second principle that influenced Bush’s vindicationism is the belief in the 
benevolence and redeeming qualities of U.S. power. This neoconservative belief emphasizes 
the exceptionalism of U.S. power and foreign policy, arguing that the U.S. is special in its 
adoption of policies that reflect both American values and interests.71 In addition, this 
principle also stresses the incorruptibility of U.S. power in the face of threats, adversaries, or 
tough decisions—there is no risk of the United States abusing its power, therefore the U.S. 
can and should reject any legal constraints upon its power.  
Finally, the third principle combines the first two to claim that the U.S. has an 
increased capacity to create liberal change and improvement in the international system.72 
This increased capacity is a result of growing leverage—the U.S. has the largest military by 
far, controls nearly a quarter of the world’s GDP, and all currencies are pegged to the dollar. 
This all culminates in the Bush Administration’s belief that the U.S. can leverage its power to 
conduct forceful political and military action that has the capability of creating new stable 
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democracies in foreign nations. Unfortunately, though, this propagates the transition theory’s 
misunderstood belief that “democracy can be promoted in the same way in any place, 
irrespective of its history.”73 
 These ideas, beliefs, and statements were then turned into action in the 2001 U.S. 
invasion of Afghanistan. The first few months of this mission were entirely dedicated to 
pushing back, fracturing, and ultimately eradicating the Taliban and al Qaeda. But, once this 
goal was seemingly accomplished by 2002, the Bush Administration and the military effort 
had to change their policies and tactics to fit in with a new mission of nation building and 
democracy promotion. This point in the war saw a complete shift in grand strategy—the U.S. 
could not maintain an active presence in Afghanistan solely in pursuit of American interests. 
An international occupation could only continue if the Afghan people believed, “it was there 
to help them, to rescue them from misgovernment, nongovernment and destitution. We [the 
U.S.] could not just use their country to pursue our own objectives.”74  
American planners, strategists, and leaders believed that, if the United States simply 
evacuated Afghanistan after defeating the Taliban and al Qaeda and neglected any form of 
rebuilding efforts, it was very likely that, “a floodtide of weapons, cash, and contraband will 
escape that state’s porous boundaries and make the world less secure for all.”75 Finally, the 
U.S. began to understand and value the necessity of not just winning military battles, but of 
winning the hearts and minds of the Afghan population. Without their support, American 
efforts would be interrupted and spoiled at every turn. The Taliban and al Qaeda were 
formidable but not undefeatable enemies; the entire Afghan population, on the other hand, 
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was something the U.S. could not overpower. Thus, it was discovered that an exclusively 
military approach would not and could not work in Afghanistan, and would also, “stir up 
Afghan nationalism that [would] only bolster the Taliban leadership and the extremists to 
whom it has given safe harbor.”76  
However, these realizations came much too late. The U.S. was already militarily 
engaged in Afghanistan, but it had no post-war plans for the country, no reconstruction 
proposals, and no strategies for how to create a new, legitimate and publicly accepted 
government once the terrorists were defeated. This meant that the U.S. had to simultaneously 
develop and implement a post-war strategy. Unsurprisingly, this was both extremely difficult 
and largely unsuccessful. Efforts were abandoned nearly as quickly as they were adopted, 
and the grand strategy discussed at the leadership level was not followed through with on the 
ground. At a meeting that debated how best to reestablish Afghanistan as a state, U.S. 
leadership agreed on a policy of “nation building lite,” where the U.S. would, “help Afghans 
establish a legitimate state that can police the territory to provide security,” that would 
hopefully in turn allow an Afghan political process to continue on its natural course without 
threatening the stability or security of the country.77  
Instead, Afghanistan was put on the fast track to democracy, a new constitution was 
drafted, and the U.S. helped put Hamid Karzai in power as the interim president of 
Afghanistan. Since then, democratization efforts have been less than effective or successful 
at both democratizing the country and crafting peace. This perhaps refutes Michael Doyle’s 
theory that democracies do not fight each other and therefore are the “ultimate political 
state,” suggesting that democratization may not be the way to bring about stability or peace 
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in every country.78 Finally, even if his theory of democratic peace is true, democracies may 
actually increase the likelihood of internal conflict depending on the demographics and 
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 After the United States, United Kingdom, and other members of NATO defeated the 
Taliban in December 2001, the international community launched a diplomatic effort to 
establish a democratic government and the necessary accompanying institutions in 
Afghanistan. The goals of this mission were to reconstruct and stabilize Afghanistan and the 
region, and prevent terrorist organizations from using the country as a safe haven and 
training ground in the future.79 While such objectives are both valiant and admirable, 
democracy building is neither a simple nor easy undertaking. It is especially difficult in a 
country like Afghanistan, which has experienced almost constant conflict for the last forty 
years, has no history of democracy, and is plagued by myriad issues, like the resource curse, 
corruption, and shocking illiteracy and poverty rates. Furthermore, in the 2000 Presidential 
Race, George W. Bush campaigned on the platform that U.S. troops should not be used in 
nation-building efforts; therefore, the U.S. was unprepared, in terms of expectations, 
resources, and planning, for such an immense reconstruction project.80 In addition to these 
impediments, the Taliban remains a prominent and viable threat to the legitimacy, stability, 
and survival of the Afghan government and constitution created by the Bonn Accords in 
2001.  
 
The Birth of the Taliban 
 While the Soviet withdrawal ended the foreign occupation of Afghanistan in 1989, it 
unfortunately did not result in stability or peace. The various mujahedeen and tribal warlords 
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lost their common enemy—the Soviets—and began fighting each other for control of the 
country, prolonging the civil war for the next five years. The Taliban took advantage of this 
state of anarchy, quickly consolidating power throughout the region.81 As different 
mujahedeen factions, tribal leaders, warlords, and drug lords fought for control of 
Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia quietly began funding the Pakistani madrassas, or religious 
schools, in an effort to promote and spread the teachings of Wahhabi Islam throughout the 
region.82 Afghan refugees who had fled their own country for Pakistan often turned to these 
madrassas for schooling; therefore, if and when those refugees returned to Afghanistan, they 
also brought with them a stricter, more extremist Islam.  
Additionally, madrassas in Afghanistan, particularly near Ghazni and Kandahar, 
created similar communities of Wahhabi students who could then link with Pakistani 
madrassa students to establish a cohesive Taliban network within Afghanistan.83 Despite 
their religious education, many of these students were actually illiterate and couldn't even 
read the Quran on their own. This in turn allowed for Taliban leadership and Muslim 
extremists to manipulate and pervert Islamic teachings, and thus recruit more followers, to fit 
the Taliban goal of establishing a pure Islamic state through the eradication of corruption and 
Western influence.84 
Yet another point of conflict and instability for Afghanistan is the Durand Line, 
drawn in 1893, which established the official border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, but 
was drawn in a manner that arbitrarily and unsympathetically divided the Pashtun tribal 
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areas. As a result, the border has been extremely fluid, allowing for Pakistan to continue 
supporting and assisting the Taliban.85 By creating a Pashtun community that spanned the 
border, the Pakistani government had an immediate pool of resources to utilize for 
interference in Afghanistan. This porous and unprotected border continues to allow for easy, 
unfettered, and largely unmonitored travel of supplies, weaponry, and soldiers—both Taliban 
and al Qaeda—between the two countries.86 This also gave Pakistan’s Inter-Services 
Intelligence Directorate the capability, rationale, and access necessary to assist in the creation 
of the Taliban as an instrument to control the Afghan government and minimize Indian 
influence in the region.87  
This should serve not only as an example, but also as a lesson for the international 
community that, much like in Africa, the drawing of haphazard borders can both create and 
escalate conflict that could have otherwise been minimized or avoided. It could be 
worthwhile to pursue talks between Afghanistan and Pakistan about redrawing the border so 
that it doesn't cut through the Pashtun community, dividing a population with heavy ties to 
the Taliban and encouraging the repeated and continued violation of the border. Another way 
to stabilize and secure the border would be to encourage an agreement between both 
countries regarding increased border control and security on both sides. Such an agreement 
would likely not come easy or cheap, but it could in turn potentially minimize Pakistan’s 
ability to provide sanctuary for the Taliban by making it costlier and riskier, while 
simultaneously decreasing conflict between the two countries.  
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The Taliban was, “created, equipped, trained, and directed by the ISI” and funded by 
the Arab Gulf states, meaning that it was born with Pakistan sponsorship and international 
financing on a silver platter ready for the taking.88 Because of Pakistan’s integral role, the 
Taliban did not suffer from many of the typical problems associated with new fledgling 
terrorist organizations. As a result, the Taliban was ready almost immediately to pursue its 
ideological goals in Afghanistan, and they were able to assume control of the country in just 
two years.89  
Such an insecure environment created a power vacuum within Afghanistan that easily 
allowed for an organization as prepared and well funded as the Taliban to push out the 
mujahedeen government and assume control. The Taliban garnered relatively widespread 
support by promising to end the ongoing conflict perpetuated by the mujahedeen, implement 
a strong sense of law and order based on a new judicial system, and create a traditional 
Islamic government. Aside from these attractive promises, so much of the country was 
exhausted by the last five years of civil war, as well as the past few decades of conflict, that 
many civilians welcomed the Taliban, and some factions of the mujahedeen even joined the 
organization’s ranks.90  
 
Taliban Rule from 1996 – 2001  
 
Five years of civil war turned Afghanistan into a lawless territory rife for the taking. 
By September 1996, the Taliban was able to win support and seize Kabul from Tajik 
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President Burhanuddin Rabbani.91 The subsequent emergence of the Taliban government 
brought about relative, albeit short lived, stability in the region; however, only three 
countries—Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Pakistan—recognized the Taliban 
government as legitimate. By 1997, the Taliban regime came to control nearly ninety percent 
of the country, forcing its opposition to retreat into the northern provinces. Past improvement 
and advancement in the areas of women’s rights or religious freedom were reversed.92 The 
government adopted strict Islamic jurisprudence, which resulted in massive ongoing human 
rights violations throughout the country.93 In resistance to the Taliban in general and to such 
policies specifically, the Northern Alliance continued its largely ineffective struggle against 
the government, never controlling more than 15 – 20 percent of the country. 94   
The Taliban government created a new judicial system, imposing “justice” based on 
an extremist Wahhabi interpretation of Sharia law combined with aspects of Pashtunwali, the 
pre-Islamic tribal code of Afghanistan.95 Where the past few decades in Afghanistan had seen 
advancements in personal liberties, the installment of extreme Sharia reversed these 
advancements, setting the country much further back than before. In particular, the Taliban 
created the Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, which worked to 
enforce laws prohibiting behavior the Taliban considered “un-Islamic”.96 In the 1970s, 
women had thrived as lawyers, teachers, and doctors; however, new Taliban regulations 
excluded women from the working world and public life. They required women to be fully 
veiled in public at all times, either in a burqa or chadri, and they could not leave the house 
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alone. Men would be arrested if their beards were not as long or longer than their fists.97 The 
Taliban also declared war on art and culture, banning music, movies, and television and 
outlawing dancing and the national sport. Other radical regulations outlawed kite flying, the 
reproduction of pictures, gambling, and British and American hairstyles.98 Punishments for 
violating such laws included stoning, amputation, and even public execution.99  
Taliban-controlled Afghanistan saw one of the world’s worst human rights records, as 
the regime committed countless massacres, executions, rape, and torture. While its war 
against women, as detailed above, was likely the most brutal and widely known, the Taliban 
did not only target women, but also denied nearly the entire population its basic human 
rights.100 The Taliban destroyed important and beloved monuments belonging to other 
religions; handed out guilty verdicts based on swift summary trials; inflicted punishments 
that were far more severe than the alleged crime; and, made healthcare and education 
difficult to access for men, and virtually inaccessible for women.101  
Such policies and actions not only harmed the Afghan people, retarding society and 
reversing the trend of advancement, but also have created huge impediments to 
democratization efforts today. The Taliban perpetuated and worsened the poor quality of life, 
causing the illiteracy rate to grow, which in turn made education and democratization 
difficult.102 Without a decent education system, there is no way for the Afghan people to 
learn about democracy and its benefits, learn how to create a functional democracy tailored 
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to such a troubled country, or understand their rights in a new system of government. The 
Taliban’s authoritative form of governance “was nothing like a liberal democracy, offering 
[the Afghan people] no experience or clear frame of reference for what was to come.”103 In a 
country such as Afghanistan with a long history dominated by examples of autocratic rule, it 
is hard to gain traction or support for democracy when the Afghan people have neither 
studied nor experienced its benefits, history, or characteristics. 
The Taliban’s discriminatory interpretation and application of Islamic law to women 
prevented, and will continue to prevent, total equality or adequate and legitimate female 
representation from occurring. Furthermore, in addition to women, the Taliban also 
suppressed opposition and minorities, ensuring nothing close to equality existed in 
Afghanistan.104 These policies and practices thus ensured that democracy was unattainable, 
because a legitimate and successful democracy cannot exist without equality. Finally, the 
Taliban explicitly opposed democracy, modernization, and Westernization. By outlawing 
Western practices and styles, the Taliban effectively negatively stigmatized the U.S., making 
it, among other Western countries, into a villain and enemy of the country, and thus the 
embodiment of everything anti-Afghanistan and anti-Muslim. Consequently, this prevented 
the Afghan people from not only planting the seed of democracy, but also from even 
dreaming of it. 
Despite the Taliban’s stated goal of eradicating corruption within the Afghan 
government and society, corruption was and continues to be a tool the Taliban uses to acquire 
and maintain power. When the Taliban gained control of the country in 1996, it was largely 
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able to do so by bribing corrupt commanders and officials to abandon their factions, militias, 
or the government in favor of joining the Taliban.105 Afghans who lived in Pakistani refugee 
camps witnessed and experienced the government effectively practice corrupt policies when 
distributing food there. Those Afghans who then joined the Taliban brought this culture of 
corruption back to Afghanistan as a major weapon against the mujahedeen and other 
forces.106 Because of this, they were able to recruit more followers not just by finding ‘true 
believers,’ but also by “buying allegiance to their cause.”107 While corruption was not limited 
to Taliban rule, their adoption of such practices further reinforced the endemic nature of 
corruption throughout Afghanistan. Its legacy continues to pervade the government and 
undermine the principles of democracy today, rendering any efforts to improve governance 
ineffective and futile.  
Despite corruption and extreme stifling of human rights, many civilians initially felt 
optimistic that Afghanistan was safer, more stable, and closer to peace under Taliban rule; 
however, the group’s support and popularity eventually waned when it became apparent that 
they had no idea how to run the government or manage the economy, both of which went 
from bad to worse under their rule.108 Furthermore, the Taliban’s virtual adoption of al Qaeda 
into its ranks was an unpopular move, both within the country and throughout the 
international community. The government allowed al Qaeda to travel freely to, from, and 
throughout the country, offering a safe haven from which bin Laden declared war on the U.S. 
in 1998.109 This escalated Afghanistan’s status and popularity as a sanctuary for terrorist 
organizations, which subsequently made it a bigger threat to and higher priority of the U.S. 
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This eventually forced America’s hand, compelling U.S. intervention in the country and 
contributing to the last thirteen years of war. 
 
 
The War on Terror in Afghanistan  
 
During the Taliban’s reign, Osama bin Laden was able to settle in the country, where 
he remained hidden from the U.S. and the Northern Alliance for years. Mullah Omar, 
“Commander of the Faithful” or leader of the Taliban government, granted al Qaeda safe 
haven in Afghanistan on the condition that the group didn't antagonize or attack the U.S.110 
Osama bin Laden’s 1998 attacks on the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya clearly 
violated these conditions; however, the Taliban did not kick al Qaeda out of the country, and 
they refused to hand bin Laden over to the United States to face consequences for his 
involvement in the attacks.111  
After the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the U.S. called for Afghanistan to hand him over, 
but the Taliban government refused yet again. The United States Congress saw this as 
justification to initiate aerial attacks, and thus approved a joint resolution that allowed 
President George W. Bush to use all necessary force against Afghanistan as part of the War 
on Terror.112 Shortly after, the U.S., its allies, and the Northern Alliance joined together as an 
anti-Taliban coalition, launching Operation ENDURING FREEDOM to prevent Afghanistan 
from being a terrorist safe haven, and thus preclude any future al Qaeda attacks on the West. 
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A powerful motivating factor was also U.S. desire and need for justice and revenge against 
those who were responsible for 9/11.113  
Five weeks after the operation began, the Northern Alliance, with the help of 
American air support, managed to capture two key cities—Kabul and Mazar-i-Sharif—and 
on December 7, the Taliban regime collapsed.114 The Taliban seemed dormant, if not 
destroyed, after this military defeat, but that was not the case. Fierce pockets of resistance, in 
the form of both Taliban and al Qaeda forces, either remained scattered throughout the 
country or escaped into Pakistan for sanctuary. From Pakistan, the Taliban was able to 
regenerate, regroup, restructure, and recruit more followers.115 Additionally, by drawing the 
U.S. into war in the Middle East, al Qaeda accomplished its goal of draining U.S. power and 
resources, harming America’s reputation abroad, and making American efforts at democracy 
that much harder.116  
 
Taliban Resurgence  
 
Instead of pacifying the region and achieving a reconciliation of the conflict, the U.S. 
and its allies were now foreign occupiers of Islamic lands. This has served to radicalize many 
Muslims to join the Taliban and al Qaeda while simultaneously perpetuating, if not 
worsening, the situation in Afghanistan.117 It appeared that the Taliban was effectively 
defeated in 2001, but the group has returned to the conflict with a vengeance, adopting al 
Qaeda tactics, such as suicide and roadside bombings, kidnappings and beheadings, and the 
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use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), in an attempt to drive the U.S. out of 
Afghanistan.118 The group began resurfacing in 2006, mostly in the southern and eastern 
parts of the country near the Pakistani border, reestablishing its status as a significant threat 
to democratic efforts in Afghanistan. In 2005, there were 21 suicide bombings and 530 IED 
bombings that were reported and attributed to the Taliban. Those numbers drastically 
increased to 141 suicide bombings and 1,297 IED bombings in 2006.119 According to another 
source, there was an average of 400 Taliban attacks per month in 2006, and that jumped to 
500 per month in 2007.120 As a result, some observers, such as Lt. Gen. David Barno, the top 
commander in Afghanistan from 2003 – 2005, noted that this resurgent group was a much 
stronger, more capable force than the one that was toppled in 2001.121 
Between 2001 and 2006, U.S. and Afghan forces saw relatively low levels of 
insurgent violence from the Taliban. Peter Bergen, American journalist and author, called the 
Taliban threat “little more than a nuisance” in 2002 and 2003.122 So, the United States and its 
allies were largely taken by surprise in mid-2006 when Taliban violence increased 
significantly. A huge factor in this was the transition of responsibility for security throughout 
all of Afghanistan from U.S. forces to NATO forces in 2005, in addition to the cutting of 
2,500 U.S. combat troops in the same year.123 At this point, the U.S. and its partners believed 
the insurgency was all but defeated. This was a huge miscalculation and exactly the move the 
Taliban was waiting for—it appeared as though the U.S. was stepping back, distracted by 
Iraq, and unconcerned about Afghanistan. Some members of the NATO coalition were not 
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fully committed to actively pursuing and fighting the insurgency, which served to bolster the 
view that the West would soon leave Afghanistan ripe for the picking.  
Finally, neither the level of international aid nor the coalition’s reconstruction efforts 
were enough to “stem the tide of an insurgency”.124 ISAF and NATO did not commit a 
sufficient enough number of troops or resources, leaving the coalition ill-equipped and 
unprepared for a revival of the Taliban. The Taliban capitalized on this, returning to 
Afghanistan at the opportune time for taking back power from the new Afghan government, 
first in rural and outskirt areas and then in the key cities.125  
Aside from U.S. disengagement, the Taliban also benefited from civilian unrest 
regarding the corruption and ineptitude of the new government. Particularly in rural areas, 
civilians were frustrated by the near complete lack of governance or security from the central 
government, making them more vulnerable, susceptible, and open to a Taliban resurgence.126 
Finally, the people of Afghanistan were disappointed and angry that, five years into foreign 
intervention and reconstruction, the economy and the country’s infrastructure were nowhere 
near rebuilt, functioning, or effective.127  
Afghan civilians were further receptive to the Taliban because of their anger about 
unnecessary civilian casualties at the hands of U.S. and coalition forces. Backlash against 
preventable civilian deaths can sometimes radicalize civilians and put them on the path to 
terrorism; in Afghanistan, this was likely the case for many new Taliban recruits. But, even if 
these civilian casualties didn't serve to radicalize, they absolutely fostered anger, disgust, and 
mistrust within the Afghan population for the U.S. and other occupying countries. In the 
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years that the Taliban retreated into Pakistan for sanctuary, they were effectively able to bide 
their time to regroup and rearm while the Afghan civilians grew increasingly disenchanted 
with the new government and the continued international occupation. 
From 2006 to 2008, NATO launched counteroffensives to clear key districts that the 
Taliban had infiltrated in an attempt to beat back the insurgency; however, there was an 
inherent problem with the counterinsurgency efforts. While the forces were successful in 
initially pushing out Taliban presence, coalition forces failed to establish Afghan governance 
in the newly cleared districts. This in turn allowed for the Taliban to return and retake the 
areas that had just been cleared once the coalition forces turned their attention to a new city 
or district. By September 2008, the counterinsurgency efforts did not look promising, and the 
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman, Admiral Mike Mullen, announced, “I’m not sure we’re 
winning.”128  
This assessment was reinforced by events in 2008, such as the Taliban prison break in 
Kandahar, the attempted assassination of President Karzai, and increased high profile attacks 
in Kabul.129  The counterinsurgency was struggling in large part because they were now 
forced to seek reconciliation and attempt reconstruction while still fighting the Taliban, 
which meant that none of the tasks received adequate attention or resources. This was 
especially problematic with the Taliban threatening and targeting schools, teachers, students, 
aid workers, and Afghans who assisted the U.S. or coalition forces, using fear and violence to 
paralyze swaths of the population.130 Without cooperation or collaboration from the local 
population, it was much harder for ISAF and NATO forces to identify and track Taliban 
members, let alone defeat them. 
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When President Obama took office in 2008, he instituted a troop surge in an effort to 
improve the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan. Giving Afghanistan the priority and 
attention it needed, Obama sent an additional 30,000 troops to the country. At its peak, the 
U.S. had 100,000 troops in Afghanistan, both working on reconstruction efforts and on 
counterterrorism operations against al Qaeda and the Taliban.131 This initially appeared 
relatively effective at stymieing the insurgency. However, Obama’s West Point 
announcement on December 1, 2009, that the U.S. would begin transitioning responsibility 
for the stabilization effort to Afghan leadership in July 2011, accompanied by a drawdown of 
U.S. forces, undermined the effectiveness of the surge.132 Some interpreted this 
announcement as a signal that the U.S. would quickly disengage from Afghanistan in the 
coming years.  
This also gave the Taliban an exact timeline by which to plan yet another resurgence 
in anticipation of U.S. withdrawal. The escalation of Taliban presence and violence 
following the withdrawal of the troop surge in 2012 and then again by the drawdown of the 
U.S. military footprint in 2013 is evidence of this.133  The Taliban was clearly emboldened by 
such actions, and “The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) 
documented 8,615 civilian deaths and injuries in 2013.”134 This was not only a significant 
increase of 14 percent from the past year’s toll, but was also the highest number since 
UNAMA began recording this data in 2009; however, the number of civilian casualties rose 
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another 22 percent in 2014, surpassed the last year’s record high escalation.135 Although the 
surge culminated in a reversal of some of the U.S. successes in Afghanistan, it has also 
allowed for a better understanding of the conflict and the resources and effort necessary to 
succeed. The question that remains, then, is whether the U.S. and its allies are ready and 
willing to commit such levels of support.  
 
Predictions for the Taliban & Afghanistan Post-2014  
 
 The U.S. Congress, through the 2013 National Defense Authorization Act, tasked the 
Center for Naval Analyses’ Center for Strategic Studies with assessing the “strength, force 
structure, force posture, and capabilities,” necessary to make the Afghan National Security 
Forces qualified and legitimate security providers for Afghanistan.136 The results of this 
assessment are grim and troubling when looking at the future of Afghanistan and its security 
following Obama’s massive troop withdrawal plan scheduled to start in 2015. However, 
Obama announced in mid-November 2014 a change in the troop withdrawal plan and, 
“quietly laid the groundwork for continuing battle against the Taliban.”137 This extension of 
U.S. troop presence will likely only serve to hold the Taliban off for that much longer; 
however, without a change in grand strategy, keeping troops in Afghanistan for another year, 
or more, will not be decisive in the success of U.S. operations or democratization. Still, it is 
important to look at the CNA assessment to understand and plan for how the U.S. can better 
position ANSF in anticipation of the eventual American withdrawal.  
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The findings from this assessment suggest numerous areas where improvement or 
assistance is needed. First, it found that the Taliban will become a bigger threat to stability 
and security following U.S. withdrawal; second, ANSF will continue to have significant gaps 
in capability that will undoubtedly limit their effectiveness once the U.S. leaves; the Ministry 
of Defense and Ministry of the Interior are not and will not be independently capable by 
2018; and, if the U.S. and NATO do not maintain training and advisory missions in 
Afghanistan, there will be a downward spiral of ANSF capabilities and Afghan security. The 
report suggests that, if not handled properly, the situation could again deteriorate into yet 
another civil war in Afghanistan.138  
As the conflict continues, it has become clearer that the Taliban is a tactical challenge 
that will not be defeated militarily, but instead requires a political solution. Thus, it is 
necessary to consider what, if any, sort of political settlement has the best chance of finally 
bringing this conflict to a close, and what sort of U.S. commitment that would require. Later 
on in the paper, I will discuss precisely how U.S. withdrawal from the country could affect 

















 The Taliban is not the only threat and obstacle to the democratization and 
securitization of Afghanistan. Such processes are further hindered by a multitude of issues: 
interference by Pakistan, the prevalence of opium and the resource curse, ethnic and religious 
divides, near total economic dependence on foreign aid, poverty and illiteracy, geography, 
the culture of tribalism, and the nature of the foreign intervention following the 2001 
invasion. Each of these obstacles can be discussed as individual threats to stability and 
democracy; however, they also weave a complicated web, intermingling, interfering, and 
intersecting with one another to make the situation that much more complex. This then 
increases the difficulty of finding a straightforward, prompt, and inexpensive solution to any 
of the numerous impediments. As a result, allied efforts to rebuild Afghan society and 
infrastructure have been hindered, and an all-encompassing solution has as of yet evaded the 
United States and its allies. In this chapter, I will discuss the obstacles I find most 
consequential in greater depth and attempt to offer a few suggestions to place Afghanistan on 




 When discussing the future of Afghanistan, it is impossible to leave neighboring 
Pakistan out of the equation, especially considering, “you can’t trust them and you can’t 
abandon them” when it comes to fighting the War on Terror.139 As long as the country’s 
leadership continues to pursue foreign policy largely defined by intervention in Afghanistan, 
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Pakistan will remain a threat to Afghan stability and security, as well as an obstacle to 
democratization. For decades, Afghanistan has simply served as one of Pakistan’s pawns in 
its struggle with India for regional dominance; therefore, Pakistan’s policies have aimed to 
keep Afghanistan weak by any means necessary in an effort to increase Pakistan’s power, 
with little regard to the chaos and violence this can and has caused in the region.140 Aside 
from using Afghanistan as a means to an end in this power struggle, Pakistan’s geographic 
location alone is cause for concern. Pakistan shares a hotly contested and dangerous border 
with Afghanistan, and its Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) have served as 
sanctuary, safe haven, recruiting grounds, and training fields for Taliban and al Qaeda 
operatives.141  
Additionally, the Pakistani government and military have maintained either overt or 
covert monetary and military support for the group since its birth.142 Pakistan’s geographic 
location and influence in the region make it impossible for the U.S. to ignore or forsake it; 
instead, the U.S. must work to improve their relationship—a relationship constantly teetering 
between allies, enemies, and begrudging partners—in order to make Pakistan a reliable ally 
that will play a supportive role in Afghanistan’s future. If the United States does not secure 
this role for Pakistan, we will instead be faced with an unfortunate reality: the Taliban may 
never be fully crushed, despite the billions of U.S. dollars spent to aid Pakistan in this 
endeavor. 
Pakistan’s state sponsorship of the Taliban has not only allowed for the group’s 
regeneration and continued survival, but has also made the conflict transnational. Idean 
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Salehyan’s study of rebel groups indicates that the use of transnational bases by non-state 
actors in civil wars can significantly increase the duration of the conflict.143 The Afghan Civil 
War supports this theory. After U.S. forces militarily defeated the Taliban in 2001, the 
organization did not fragment or break down, but was able to retreat into Pakistan to 
regenerate in peace. It has used this Pakistani sanctuary to wait for the U.S. to withdraw and 
then launch a new attack to regain control of Afghanistan. We have already seen evidence of 
this leading up to the severe drawdown of American forces that occurred at the end of 2014, 
and it is likely that such efforts will only grow as long as the status quo remains.144  
By making the conflict transnational, the Taliban either ensured that they would have 
a permanent sanctuary, or guaranteed that the U.S. would be drawn into a risky and costly 
interstate conflict with Pakistan. The risks of invading Pakistan—it could create an interstate 
conflict and also hinder American operations in the region—outweighed any potential 
success such an invasion could achieve. But, as a result, the coalition forces have not been 
able to neutralize Pakistan as a sanctuary for the Taliban, nor have they been able to provide 
security to the border areas.145  Thus, it is clear that the Taliban’s choice and ability to make 
the conflict transnational have prolonged the group’s survival, lengthened the conflict, and 
made it deadlier.  
In an effort to halt this support to the Taliban, the United States offered Pakistan an 
ultimatum just days after the 9/11 attacks—stop assisting the Taliban, and Pakistan would 
receive a hefty U.S. aid package. But, failure to choose the U.S. over the Taliban would pit 
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Pakistan as an enemy of the U.S.146 On September 12, 2001, Senator Biden warned of such 
an ultimatum, saying: “Pakistan in particular is going to have to make a very difficult choice 
very soon, for we are counting…Words will not be sufficient, actions will be demanded.”147 
Pakistan wisely pledged allegiance to the U.S. and has received nearly $19 billion since 9/11 
as a result.148 However, while the Pakistani government may have publicly renounced its 
support for the Taliban, it appears that their Inter-Services Intelligence agency may still be 
playing both sides, covertly assisting the group while overtly condemning them.  
But, because there is not enough hard proof of Pakistani involvement, the U.S. is 
forced to offer more and more aid in hopes that it will finally incentivize Pakistan enough to 
fully cooperate. This has created a perverse incentive.149 As long as the Taliban remains a 
viable threat, the U.S. will feel obligated to provide increased economic aid so that Pakistan 
can and will fight terrorism. However, because of this, Pakistan has no incentive to defeat the 
Taliban outright—if the Taliban is defeated, there is no reason for the U.S. to stay engaged in 
Pakistan, which would result in a loss of substantial American aid.150 While not the only 
consequence of American involvement in this conflict, U.S. assistance to Pakistan has both 
deterred Pakistan from cutting ties with the Taliban and has also likely bankrolled Pakistan’s 
continued funding of the group.  
Pakistan has the potential to be an extremely helpful ally in stabilizing Afghanistan, 
eradicating the Taliban, and allowing for democratization; however, as long as Pakistan 
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maintains its strategy of saying one thing publicly and then doing something entirely 
different privately, it will remain a serious obstacle to U.S. efforts in Afghanistan. If that is 
the case, the United States will be forced to neutralize this impediment, either through 
military threats, denial of aid, economic sanctions, or diplomatic negotiation. The United 
States must live up to the promises it made in 2001, when Bush declared that, “A coalition 
partner must do more than just express sympathy; a coalition partner must perform,” and if 
they don't perform, “they will be held accountable for inactivity.”151 In order to achieve any 
level of progress after spending trillions of dollars and nearly fourteen years in Afghanistan, 
the U.S. must make it too costly for Pakistan to intervene or subvert reconstruction and 
democratization efforts in Afghanistan any longer. 
 
Opium & the Resource Curse 
 
In addition to having a neighbor that is determined to either prevent or counteract 
U.S. attempts to democratize Afghanistan, the country is also fraught with a serious drug 
problem. In recent years, Afghanistan has become the world’s greatest illicit opium 
producer.152 Such a widespread and institutionalized prevalence of opium and the drug trade 
foments government corruption, increases crime and instability, prevents democracy, helps 
finance the insurgency, and harms the economy. It has also resulted in the resource curse, an 
economic dependence on opium that impedes or squashes other potentially viable economic 
markets. Finally, the Taliban has been able to capitalize on this illicit economy, participating 
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in and using taxes on the drug trade to finance their efforts to terrorize any opponents and 
regain control of the country.153  
Despite efforts to eradicate the opium crop and minimize drug trafficking, 
Afghanistan now produces nearly 90% of the world’s illicit opiates, making the Afghan 
opium market the biggest in the world.154 In the past four years, nearly everything related to 
opium production has grown or increased. In 2011, Afghan income from opium massed $1.4 
billion, or 9% of the gross domestic product. That same year, the poppy crop cultivation 
spread over 131,000 hectares, which was an increase of 7% from the past year, and which in 
turn increased opium production by 61%.155 In 2012, income increased to $2.4 billion, which 
accounted for 15% of Afghan GDP.156 Over the span of the next year, poppy cultivation rose 
36%, and opium production jumped 50%, reaching the highest levels since the fall of the 
Taliban. From 2013 to 2014, eradication of poppy crops decreased 63%, and the production 
of opium increased by 17%.157 Opium trafficking reached a historic level this past year, and 
it is now estimated to be approximately 20% of Afghanistan’s GDP, making opium 
production and trafficking an $8 billion per year business.158 Allowing this illicit economy to 
continue growing, particularly at such a rapid pace, is and will be extremely detrimental to 
democratization and reconstruction efforts. 
The ways in which the existence of this massive illicit economy can, will, and have 
affected Afghanistan’s growth, maturation, and democratization are numerous and extremely 
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harmful. First, the existence and growth of the drug trade have both created and increased 
government corruption. The Afghan political system and drug trafficking have become very 
deeply entwined. Specifically in 2014, the protracted nature of the presidential elections led 
directly to an increase in poppy cultivation.159 The prolonged elections, which lasted over 
eight months, increased the politicians’ demands for campaign funding, and the illicit 
economy provided the easiest and most efficient way to acquire this money. Aside from 
simply tying high-ranking politicians to the drug trade, this also in turn diverted police and 
military resources away from the government’s opium eradication efforts, allowing the drug 
trade to grow nearly unchecked for months.160  
The 2014 elections were just another example of the opium economy and politics 
intertwining. The drug trade has been linked to extremely high-level officials since the 2001 
U.S. invasion, including some close to President Hamid Karzai. His half-brother Ahmed 
Wali Karzai, the Chairman of the Kandahar Provincial Council, was repeatedly linked to this 
illicit economy until his death in 2011.161 During his time in Kandahar, the second largest 
opium cultivating area in Afghanistan, there were many widely circulated reports of his 
alleged involvement in the opium trade. President Karzai adamantly and vehemently 
defended his half-brother, but the allegations and their close proximity to the president both 
damaged Karzai’s credibility and made it harder for the U.S. to support his government.162  
This is just one example where, “narco-corruption went to the top of the Afghan 
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“drug traffickers were buying off hundreds of police chiefs, judges and other officials,” 
throughout Karzai’s presidency.164 Finally, a valued and validated U.S. informant alleged, “A 
lot of people in the Afghan government are involved in drug trafficking.”165 These officials 
are either allegedly part of the drug trade or receive kickbacks from drug lords attempting to 
stay under the radar of law enforcement. The opium production and trade, which continues to 
grow largely unabated, may soon become the country’s top source of income, which would 
likely result in its wider acceptance by government officials at all levels.  
It is hugely challenging to democratize the provinces where the drug trade is 
conducted. The opium trade undermines those provinces’ legal apparatuses and provides an 
attractive, more profitable alternative to the licit economy and legitimate government.166 In 
turn, this discourages the Afghan people in these provinces from participating in the 
democratic process, rendering the efforts of the U.S. and the new Afghan government futile. 
The continued involvement of Afghan officials from all levels of government in the drug 
trade will delegitimize their authority and destabilize the country, likely to a point of no 
return.  
Aside from fostering government corruption, the opium trade also tends to feed anti-
democratic forces, fueling the Taliban insurgency and bringing more and more instability 
into the region. Although the Taliban government of the 1990s was the only government to 
effectively eradicate opium production, the current Taliban organization is a much more 
active participant in the drug trade.167 They have moved from simply “collecting extortion 
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other smuggling schemes.”168 This intersection of the insurgency and the drug trade makes 
the eradication or defeat of both impediments even more difficult. The increased revenue 
from the drug trade has not only “bankroll[ed] the resurgence of the Taliban,” but also has 
changed the nature of the insurgency from strictly ideological and religious to profit-
driven.169  
NATO military intelligence has deduced that, by 2009, as few as 5% of insurgent 
commanders were fighting for ideological reasons anymore, which in turn provides evidence 
that it is, “no longer possible to treat the insurgency and the drug trade as separate 
matters.”170 The Taliban’s access to and utilization of the opium economy has created an 
insurgency that is now better funded than it ever was before; this wealth of funding could in 
turn be used to launch massive and deadly attacks both within the country and outside the 
region, making the destruction of the illicit economy a key security issue to Afghanistan, the 
U.S., and the international community. 
Finally, opium production and trafficking have stifled the economy and made it much 
harder for legitimate markets to prevail or succeed. The nature of the drug trade consolidates 
the profits of opium production in the hands of very few players, most of whom do not even 
live in Afghanistan. The farmers who cultivate poppy crop do not see the economic return, 
but instead, the “drugs drain money from [the] country, and they don't bring the profits back 
home.”171 Not only does Afghanistan fail to receive the economic benefit from the drug 
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trade, but also, the “new outflow of drug money offsets inflows of investment and aid, 
making it impossible to wrench Afghanistan out of poverty.”172  
Instead of pouring more and more aid into the Afghan economy, the U.S. and other 
international partners should first work to help the Afghan government replace the drug trade 
with a licit market that will, in the long run, profit the country and its population more than 
opium production ever could. The trafficking of drugs has “suffocate[d] the normal economic 
development,” of Afghanistan and made it much harder to establish legitimate sources of 
income, which is the only way for Afghanistan to eventually achieve stability, security, and 
independence.173  
Yury Fedotov, the executive director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime, succinctly summed up the threat the opium economy poses to Afghanistan, its 
government, and democratization efforts, saying “the illicit opium economy and related 
criminality and corruption continue to undermine security, the rule of law, health and 
development in the region and beyond.”174 The drug trade is not only a cause of insecurity 
and poor governance, but also it is the direct result. The southern and southwest regions of 
Afghanistan, where poppy cultivation thrives, are also the regions where governance has 
become either extremely inefficient or largely nonexistent, where security is yet to be 
established, and where access to licit crops is severely lacking. In these provinces, then, 
“poppy increasingly became a low-risk crop in a high-risk environment.”175 The only way for 
Afghanistan to have a chance of improving its governance and security is to get rid of the 
opium economy, which goes hand in hand with defeating and destroying the Taliban. As of 
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today, one of these cannot exist without the other—the Taliban relies heavily, if not entirely, 
on funding from the drug trade, and the drug trade can only exist as long as it has a criminal 
network, provided by the Taliban, that will produce and traffic the opium. Consequently, the 
U.S. and Afghan forces should create a joint and multipronged strategy to attack the drug 
trade at its head, which will in turn eliminate the Taliban’s funding and eventually render the 
organization irrelevant.  
 
Economic Dependence on Foreign Aid 
 
 Leading up to the 2001 intervention, the state of the economy in Afghanistan, one of 
the world’s poorest countries, was abysmal at best. Today, after over a decade of pouring 
billions of U.S. aid dollars into the country, the economy is still struggling and showing signs 
of slumping as the U.S. withdraws and aid decreases.176 While the U.S. withdrawal does not 
mean an end to monetary aid, it does represent a minimization of efforts in Afghanistan to 
reconstruct society and the economy. Without a stable, independent economy and secure 
methods of income, the new Afghan government will have little leverage, power, or ability to 
exert its control throughout the country. As a result, Afghans will turn even further away 
from the licit economy, which has provided very little room for profit or growth, and toward 
the illicit economy. Finally, the way in which the United States provided aid or made it 
available helped contribute to corruption in various aspects of society and government.177 As 
long as the U.S. continues to provide this decreased level of aid in such a non-credible and 
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unregulated way, the Afghan economy will likely not find a way to stabilize and become 
self-sufficient, which in turn could render most democratic efforts futile. 
 According to the World Bank, foreign aid to Afghanistan has generated the majority 
of the country’s GDP for the last decade.178 Between 2007 and 2014, the aid from the United 
States alone accounted for nearly 75% of the country’s GDP. This aid, in turn, allowed for 
the Afghan economy to expand as much as 14% each year; however, the deterioration in 
security paired with the impending U.S. withdrawal at the end of 2014 resulted in a serious 
decline in economic growth last year, estimated at 3.2%, a dismal figured compared to the 
previous years.179 This near complete dependence on foreign aid, and U.S. aid in particular, 
is extremely problematic when looking at the future of the Afghan economy and governance. 
Economic aid to Afghanistan cannot and will not last forever. While the U.S. has pledged 
continued aid of about $8 billion annually for the next few years, that will eventually end.180  
Additionally, that is a significant decrease in the amount of aid Afghanistan has 
grown accustomed to receiving from the United States. As this aid decreases, there are no 
markets in the Afghan economy to supplement such levels of income. Afghanistan’s biggest 
source of “independent” income comes from the opium drug trade, which amounts to about 
$8 billion per year; however, most of that income is consolidated amongst a few ‘elite’ 
members of the trade, many of whom don't live in Afghanistan.181 Without a market to 
replace foreign aid and compete with the illicit economy, President Ghani will have trouble 
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not only maintaining governance, but he will also struggle to effectively fight the Taliban 
while continuing to finance reconstruction efforts. 
 A decrease in foreign aid is not the only, or even the major, problem related to 
Afghanistan and the aid it has received. More harmful than a loss of U.S. aid is the way in 
which the United States has provided Afghanistan with money over the past thirteen years. 
The U.S. has spent over $100 billion in aid to Afghanistan since 2002, yet, “all of that has not 
bought…a single sustainable institution or program” for Afghanistan.182 Instead of helping 
Afghanistan, this aid may have actually done more harm to the economy, while also injuring 
the government in the process. The U.S. has introduced countless initiatives and programs to 
improve the standard of living, increase literacy, create jobs, and so forth; however, “state 
institutions remain fragile and unable to provide good governance, deliver basic services to 
the majority of the population or guarantee human security.”183  
Furthermore, the few gains that have been made—particularly in education, health, 
and roads—have been unimpressive when looking at Afghanistan’s starting point, or have 
been destroyed by subsequent Taliban attacks. Now, more than thirteen years later, 
Afghanistan still has the world’s highest infant mortality rate, over half of Afghan children 
are malnourished, and the country “still ranks near the bottom on per capita income, literacy, 
life expectancy, electricity usage, Internet penetration, and on the World Bank’s broad 
Human Development Index.”184  
 Not only has foreign aid been insufficient to and unsuccessful at rebuilding 
Afghanistan, creating a legitimate economy, and improving its standard of living, but the 
manner in which aid was made available also has led to increased government corruption. 
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Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton described U.S. aid to Afghanistan as having, “very 
little credibility for what was invested.”185 The government and aid agencies have done a 
poor job of monitoring the aid, how much is actually needed, where it goes, and how it is 
spent. Specifically, USAid and the Department of Defense have repeatedly granted million- 
and billion-dollar projects to private contractors, whom they then fail to monitor.  
This lack of oversight has allowed for many projects to be incorrectly completed 
without anyone noticing. For example, the Defense Department hired a private contractor to 
build a dining facility; on completion, it was discovered that the dining facility did not even 
have a kitchen and thus could not be used.186 In a possibly even more ridiculous case, a 
compound of buildings, which cost $2.4 million to build, was constructed outside of, rather 
than inside, the military base’s security walls. No one noticed this until the buildings were 
complete, rendering the buildings entirely unusable.187  
Neglecting to monitor where U.S. aid goes has not only led to these mistakes, but has 
also allowed for corruption to run unchecked. By creating a “donor-drunk economy” in an 
extremely corrupt nation, the United States has provided seemingly endless funds to sixteen 
Afghan ministries that cannot “be counted on to keep the funds from being stolen or 
wasted.”188 For example, a U.S. audit uncovered that hundreds of millions of dollars granted 
to the Ministry of Public Health were found as misappropriated because the Ministry had 
been paying salaries in cash. This same audit also suggested that delivering more direct aid to 
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Afghan government officials was, “the biggest gamble with taxpayer money that U.S.A.I.D. 
has ever made.”189  
In another instance, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction 
found a case in which the U.S. provided $1.1 billion for the Afghan military to buy fuel 
without first determining how much fuel the military even needed. Upon further inspection, 
the military destroyed the fuel dispersal records, suggesting that they likely had something to 
hide. Giving such unchecked and flowing aid to a country as corrupt as Afghanistan was, 
“like giving booze and car keys to a teenager,” irresponsible and reckless.190 However, the 
Afghans are not solely to blame, and the United States must improve its standards and 
practices of granting aid to prevent its misuse. If U.S. aid continues in this manner, it will be 
ineffectual, harmful, and ultimately very destructive to any and all democratization efforts, as 
well as unnecessarily costly to the American taxpayers. 
 
Ethnic & Religious Divides 
 
 The demographic design of Afghanistan is one in which national unity, loyalty to 
one’s country, and a cohesive Afghan identity do not exist. Instead, it is a fragmented country 
divided along the lines of ethnicity, religion, tribe, and language.191 These divides then serve 
as serious obstacles to building a liberal democracy, as they make national unity, cohesion, 
and cooperation extremely difficult. Furthermore, the form of democracy that Afghanistan 
adopted with the Bonn Accords—majoritarian with the Single Non-Transferable Vote—has 
only served to exacerbate these divides, prevent compromise amongst the various groups, 
and create an even larger impediment to a legitimate democracy. 
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 Afghanistan, a multi-ethnic Muslim state, is comprised of four distinct ethnic 
groups—Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara, and Uzbek. While there are many other minority ethnic 
tribes scattered throughout the country, these four are the most prominent. The Pashtun, 
comprising nearly 40% of the population, are known for their active roles in the insurgency 
and within the Taliban ranks.192 The Tajiks, the second largest ethnic group at between 27 – 
30%, make up the wealthy and educated elite of Afghanistan. This group possesses 
significant political influence, and one of its most prominent members was Ahmed Shah 
Massoud, the Northern Alliance leader who helped fight the Taliban.193 The third biggest 
group, the Hazara, make up 15% of the population and are predominantly Shia Muslim. 
Since the 2001 invasion, many Hazara have filled important offices in the Afghan 
government, where they staunchly oppose any compromise with or integration of the Taliban 
into the democratic government.194 Finally, the Uzbeks make up approximately 10% of 
Afghanistan’s population. The Uzbeks are concentrated in the northern plains of 
Afghanistan, where they abide by a very strict patriarchal social and tribal structure.195  
It is with these four ethnic groups, then, that Afghans identify —rather than calling 
themselves Afghan when asked about origin, they identify as Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek, 
or some other minority ethnic group. This is sufficiently harmful to national unity, because 
there is no such thing as a cohesive identity. Instead, the Afghan people largely find that 
“tribal identity and loyalty are paramount importance,” and are particularly more important 
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than a national identity or loyalty to the country, government, and population as a whole.196 
This further widens the schism between the various ethnic groups, as it reemphasizes the 
divisiveness of the “tribal-centric” societal structure.197 
 Aside from the deep ethnic divides, Afghanistan is also home to nearly four hundred 
different tribes or clans, many of which speak different languages. Half of the Afghan 
population speaks Dari, two-thirds speak Pashto, and the remaining fifteen percent speak 
dozens of other tribal dialects.198 This linguistic diversity makes the democratization process 
all the more complex. First, it makes communication extremely difficult and complicates the 
political process, as there is not one universal language that everyone speaks or understands. 
Second, this again widens the schism between tribes, “accentuat[ing] feelings of 
individualism and separatism,” because many of them speak their own distinct languages.199 
These tribes, which can often not communicate amongst one another, are also not used to 
working together; they have always been their own source of support, and they only worked 
together when they needed to collectively fight off invaders.200  Without a unifying language 
or way to communicate, especially when paired with an absence of a tradition of cooperation 
or even intermingling, these tribes have almost been forced to remain separate and 
independent.  
 Finally, religion is the last, and likely least divisive, line on which Afghanistan’s 
population is divided. The majority of the Afghan people, 80%, are Sunni Muslim, with the 
remaining 20% adhering to the Shia sect of Islam.201 Except under the Taliban rule, the 
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Sunni-Shia schism has been much less divisive in recent times than it has been in other 
surrounding countries. Still, this makes governance and the formation of a cohesive, 
representative government in Afghanistan even harder. There is a chance that the current 
Sunni-Shia conflicts occurring within Iraq and Syria, aggravated by the Islamic State of Iraq 
and Syria’s (ISIS) ongoing operations within the two countries, could conceivably spill over, 
provoking the Afghan Sunnis and Shiites into a more tense or combative relationship. In late 
March 2015, news reports began surfacing of a new ISIS contingent in Afghanistan, which is 
something that will undoubtedly affect the coalition forces. Yet another concern is that, with 
the Taliban still jockeying for control and power, the group may choose to exacerbate the 
division between Sunnis and Shiites to improve their leverage. 
 The lack of homogeneity on nearly any line in Afghanistan has served as a serious 
impediment to democratization. Without a unified people, there is little chance for 
legitimizing a central government. The lack of national unity and the dearth of loyalty to 
Afghanistan completely undermine all efforts at democracy. Throughout history, local 
Afghan tribes have resisted attempts to unify and create a centralized government. Instead, 
they have chosen time and again to remain loyal to their tribes, their religious institutions, 
and their families. Consequently, many Afghans do not trust, believe in, or desire a central 
state, and thus ignore or try to fight the services and infrastructure provided by the 
government. In a country whose citizens actively dislike or oppose the very existence of a 
centralized government, it becomes next to impossible to impose any sort of rule of law or 
gain the legitimacy necessary to rule; therefore, it is necessary for the current Afghan regime 
to find a way to minimize to the greatest extent the ethnic, linguistic, tribal, and religious 
divides in order for democracy to find a home in Afghanistan. Otherwise, they should 
64 
consider the option of leaving Afghanistan be and allowing the country to choose its own 




 After trillions of dollars and over a decade spent in Afghanistan, it is tough to 
appreciate what success, if any, the U.S. intervention has achieved. The failure of the U.S. to 
gain its objectives can be seen as a direct result of the nature of the foreign intervention in 
Afghanistan. Rather than looking at the big picture of Afghanistan as a nation that would 
need to be rebuilt after the conflict, the Bush Administration simply viewed it as a base from 
which the Taliban and al Qaeda had been freely operating.202 Instead of factoring in nation 
building, discussions about the intervention focused solely on the War on Terror aspect. 
Some military leadership called this sort of policy reaction one-dimensional: “we focused on 
al-Qaeda, the direct security threat to the United States, not on the problems of Afghanistan. 
If we did not want to repeat the same mistakes, the United States had to engage, mobilize the 
United Nations, and lead an effort to establish legitimate government and reconstruct the 
economy.”203   
Instead, the U.S. began the process of reconstruction before the actual war was over, 
which meant neither reconstruction nor fighting the Taliban could be done at full strength. 
Finally, the United States’ failure to establish a post-war plan for Afghanistan before 
launching the 2001 intervention meant that the U.S. was making up the plans as it went 
along. This alone has been extremely detrimental to the democratization efforts in 
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Afghanistan, which should not have been attempted until the fighting against the Taliban and 
al Qaeda was concluded and security was soundly established.   
 While opportunism and evil are sure to exist in Afghanistan, just as they exist 
throughout the world, they find their windows of opportunity when people become desperate 
and lack alternatives.204 The obstacles enumerated in this chapter have contributed to and 
created this desperation that has subsequently destabilized Afghanistan and its government, 
while simultaneously strengthening the Taliban. Such deeply entrenched obstacles will 
without a doubt be difficult to overcome in trying to establish a liberal democracy in 
Afghanistan. They may even be impossible; however, just because progress has been 
minimal, we should not discount the potential for Afghanistan to democratize. Only thirteen 
years ago, Afghanistan was ruled by the repressive, theocratic authority of the Taliban 
regime, there was little governmental infrastructure, and even fewer liberties and 
freedoms.205 Change does not happen overnight, and the overhaul and reconstruction of an 
entire country, its governing system, and its economy will require time, money, hard work, 
and seemingly unlimited of patience. A comprehensive strategy for rebuilding Afghanistan 
will require a multilateral effort at establishing security and continuing aid, a better plan for 
giving out aid and monitoring its use, a system of government that allows for cooperation 
between ethnicities, religions, and tribes rather than only reinforcing competition, and finally 
a renewed dedication to improving education and the standard of living for all Afghans. 
Afghanistan must remain a priority for the United States, otherwise, similar to Iraq, it will 
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The Bonn Conference 
Following the U.S. invasion and the collapse of the Taliban, the United Nations 
convened the 2001 Bonn Conference to rebuild Afghanistan on November 27.206 The 
agreement borne out of this conference provided the basis for the foundation of 
Afghanistan’s political and civil institutions and established a process for political 
reconstruction. Four anti-Taliban delegations, as well as representatives from eighteen 
different countries, were in attendance. The four anti-Taliban groups were the Northern 
Alliance, the Cypress group (exiles with ties to Iran), the Rome Group (loyal to former King 
Mohammed Zahir Shah), and the Peshawar Group (Pashtun exiles in Pakistan).207 Despite 
Pakistan’s lobbying for the inclusion of moderate Taliban delegates, the Taliban as a whole 
was excluded from these talks. The Bonn Conference was tasked with creating an interim 
administration that would run the country for three to six months until an Emergency Loya 
Jirga208 could be held to elect a transitional government; however, tensions sparked between 
the different groups, and U.S. Special Envoy to Afghanistan Jim Dobbins was unsure if they 
would be able to successfully complete the conference.209   
The two most contentious aspects of the conference were who would lead the interim 
government and what the peacekeeping forces would look like. The Northern Alliance 
wanted a peacekeeping force in Kabul comprised entirely of Afghans. On the other hand, the 
rest of the delegates called for a multinational force out of fear that an all-Afghan force 
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would result in the same abuses that occurred under Northern Alliance rule following Soviet 
withdrawal in 1989.210 The Northern Alliance, under the leadership of Burhanuddin Rabbani, 
opposed the creation of the interim government by the conference, and instead called for 
direct Afghan elections. In an effort to keep the talks going, and under pressure from the 
U.S., Russia twisted the Northern Alliance’s arm until its younger members agreed to 
continue participating in the conference whether or not they had Rabbani’s support.211 As a 
result, the talks continued, and the delegates finally decided on the parameters for an 
acceptable agreement.  
On December 5, 2001, the Bonn Conference resolved that there would be a 29-
member interim administration with Hamid Karzai as Chairman. The peacekeeping force in 
Kabul would be an international one organized by the U.N. and led by Britain. These forces 
would not only maintain security in Kabul and other areas, but also would train Afghan 
security forces and support reconstruction efforts.212 The former King Zahir Shah was given 
a largely symbolic role in an attempt to appease his supporters and include him in the 
process. The conference agreed that there would be an Emergency Loya Jirga convened 
within six months of the establishment of the interim government.213 The Loya Jirga was 
then tasked with electing a transitional government that would lead the country for two years 
until the 2004 presidential elections. The agreement also decreed that a Constitutional 
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government so that they could create a new constitution within the next eighteen months. 
Finally, the Bonn Agreement vested Afghanistan’s judicial powers within a new Supreme 
Court assembled by the interim administration.214 Six months later, on June 13, 2002, Hamid 
Karzai was elected President of the Transitional Government of Afghanistan, a position he 
held for the next two years until the 2004 presidential elections.215 
 
The New Constitution of Afghanistan 
 
On January 4, 2004 Afghanistan’s 502-member assembly approved a new 
constitution that established an Islamic democracy with a presidential system. A 35-member 
team worked for a year to draft this new constitution, which was released for debate in the 
Loya Jirga on November 3, 2003.216 Before this, the team hosted numerous nationwide 
public meetings, asking nearly half a million Afghans for their input and ideas regarding the 
new constitution. After the Loya Jirga received the constitution, it took them only three 
weeks to debate and then ratify it.217 The system of government created by the new 
constitution was roughly based off of the structure of the American government, featuring a 
division of power between legislative, executive, and judicial branches. However, power was 
not evenly divided, and instead this system “envisage[d] a strong presidency,” a weaker two-
chamber parliament, and an independent judiciary.218  
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The newly created legislative branch is bicameral, with the House of the People and 
the House of Elders, called the Wolesi Jirga and the Meshrano Jirga respectively. The Wolesi 
Jirga is the upper house and holds the majority of the power in the legislature. It consists of 
249 members directly elected through a proportional representation system.219 In an attempt 
to improve gender equality, it was decided that at least 64 of these 249 members must be 
women.220 The duties of the House of the People are to create and ratify laws, as well as to 
approve or veto the actions of the president. The lower house, the House of Elders, is 
comprised currently of 102 appointed and indirectly elected members who also ratify laws; 
however, the House of Elders is mostly an advisory body and can be overruled by the House 
of the People on policies regarding the state’s budget and development programs.221 The 
legislature, also known as the National Assembly, which retains the ability to confirm or 
deny cabinet appointments, operates as a relatively insignificant check on the executive 
branch. While the constitution both provides for some minority representation and creates a 
pretty inclusive legislature, the power imbalance between the legislative and executive 
branches render those advancements much less important.  
The executive branch features a unitary presidential system in which the president is 
elected for a maximum of two five-year terms. The president must be a Muslim, and he or 
she must also be an Afghan citizen born of Afghan parents.222 The duties of the President 
include serving as Commander-in-Chief of Afghanistan’s Armed Forces, crafting policy, and 
appointing ministers: an Attorney General, a director for the Central Bank, Supreme Court 
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justices, and the first and second Vice Presidents.223 The new constitution ensures that the 
government’s powers are largely concentrated in the office of the President and prevents 
challengers from arising by creating a single party government.  
The new, independent judicial system features High Courts, Appeals Courts, and 
local and district courts, with the Supreme Court, or the Stera Mahkama, as the top court of 
the country.224 Members of the Supreme Court are appointed for ten-year terms. Eligible 
judges can choose to be trained in either Islamic jurisprudence or secular law, which has 
huge potential to lead to discord regarding religious freedom and women’s rights. The 2004 
constitution “enshrines equal rights for women” and men; however, Islamic law still treats 
women as subordinate to men, forcing them to remain dependent on male relatives. The 
problem with this arises because the new constitution declares that no Afghan law “can be 
contrary to the beliefs and provisions” of Islam.225 Furthermore, courts make decisions in a 
case-by-case method, meaning that conservative judges will likely make conservative rulings 
and reformist judges will likely make more moderate or modern rulings; rather than 
establishing judicial precedent for the country, this will create contradictory decisions most 
often in regard to gender equality and religious freedoms. 
The rationale behind the constitution and the government structure it established is 
simultaneously transparent and contradictory. Initially, Afghanistan sought to create a 
government with a weak center to ensure that the executive office couldn’t or wouldn’t turn 
into a dictatorship; however, this posed a problem for legitimizing the central government as 
the dominant power over the strong regional warlords. When President Karzai assumed the 






with the president. The advantage of having a powerful central leader in charge of the 
executive is that it creates executive stability and avoids multiparty gridlock so that the 
government can produce and pass legislation. It also creates direct legitimacy in one unifying 
figurehead.226 The fixed two-term limit of five years each was established as a bulwark to 
prevent any president from usurping too much power. But, some of Karzai’s dissenters 
suggest that he wanted to create a weak, ineffective, and deeply fragmented system so that 
there would be no room for a legitimate challenger to rise up against him in opposition.227 
This helped President Karzai weaken the legislative branch and minimize their effectiveness, 
which in turn buttressed his importance and magnified his role as leader of Afghanistan.  
Aside from this, the system of government set up by the 2004 constitution has also 
created numerous other problems. First, it established a highly majoritarian system favoring 
the Pashtuns. President Karzai, a member of the Pashtun tribe, won the 2004 presidential 
election with just over half of the votes based on only about 25 percent voter turnout.228 This 
resulted in representation by the largest clan, rather than by all of the ethnic groups, which in 
turn results in the failure to properly represent all other ethnic groups. Another problem is 
that judicial review comes from a highly religiously oriented court that has actually retarded 
and reversed many of the advancements in women’s rights. Corruption was rampant at the 
Central Bank, under the control of the executive, and it had to be closed because the bank’s 
leaders were stealing billions of dollars.229 Additionally, the constitution and the way in 
which the new government was formed created interest groups that were primarily 
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outsiders—Britain, Europe, and the United States—rather than creating insider interest 
groups that would lobby for Afghan interests.  
As previously mentioned, there is no party system, so there is no mechanism by 
which to hold a candidate responsible to party values and no solid way to know exactly what 
lines on which a candidate will be voting. There is no decentralization or federalism, so full 
control is even further consolidated in the central government. This is problematic in terms of 
keeping the Taliban at bay, because they are more able to withdraw into the mountains or 
other hard-to-access regions that have little to no government oversight or control. Aside 
from being unable to keep the Taliban from regaining control, it also makes it difficult to 
provide simple services to the Afghan people in outskirt or tribal regions. Lastly, the new 
constitution still allowed for regional warlords and other criminals to either retain their 
offices or gain government positions. For example, many of the government officials 
currently in office were accused of major human rights violations that occurred during their 
time as tribal leaders, yet they haven’t faced any legal consequences and are still in office.230 
 
2004 Presidential Elections 
 
The Bonn Agreement of 2001 called for Afghanistan’s first presidential elections to 
be held in 2004. In anticipation of these elections, approximately 10.5 million Afghans—
more than one-third of the entire country—registered to vote. While this number is 
impressive on its own, what is even more staggering is that women made up 41.3 percent of 
registered voters.231 On October 9, Election Day, approximately three-quarters of registered 
voters showed up to the polling sites to cast ballots. While such widespread participation data 
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was overwhelmingly impressive for Afghanistan’s first elections, there was still a lot upon 
which to improve. The 2004 elections were judged by Freedom House to be ‘Not Free’; 
however, ratings for freedom, civil liberties, and political rights have improved from a 7 to a 
6, which should be viewed as progress for such a turbulent time.232 However, there were also 
allegations of widespread intimidation, serious localized fraud, and heavy violence. Many 
polling stations couldn't even open because of the violence in the area and the lack of 
security forces to defend the sites. There was a lack of resources, such as ink, needed to open 
some of the polling stations and conduct the elections, and the elections had to be postponed 
twice due to the insecure environment.233 Despite all of this, the overall results were broadly 
accepted in Afghanistan, and President Karzai was declared the first democratically elected 
president of Afghanistan. 
 President Karzai resumed office facing a lot of major problems. First, he was elected 
with a very bare majority of votes, which was only possible because pockets of Afghan 
refugees—mostly Pashtun—in Pakistan and Iran were allowed to vote. Although Karzai did 
win three times as many votes as any other candidate, his failure to receive a distinct majority 
helped weaken his political legitimacy and the legitimacy of the presidential system.234 His 
administration was plagued by the challenges of forging national unity, disarming regional 
militias, and tackling drug production and trade. Additionally, Karzai’s biggest challenge was 
to target and dismantle the Taliban in Afghanistan, a task nearly insurmountable even with 
American assistance. Not only was he unsuccessful in that regard, but also the Taliban 
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regularly tormented, interrupted, and destabilized his reconstruction efforts and attempts at 
political centralization.  
Lastly, these elections were only possible with Western support in protecting voting 
stations, ensuring security before, on, and after voting day, and providing funding.235 For the 
first democratic elections, particularly after such a volatile civil war, it is expected that 
Afghanistan would need such monetary assistance, in addition to military and diplomatic 
support; however, this funding will not always be available, so Afghanistan should try to 
achieve relative economic independence as soon as possible. While there many problematic 
characteristics and results related to the 2004 Presidential elections in Afghanistan, it is 
extremely promising that such elections even took place and that such large numbers of 
Afghans chose to participate.  
 
The Single Non-Transferable Vote 
 
After winning the 2004 presidential elections, President Karzai was responsible for 
selecting an electoral system to be used for the legislative and provincial council elections. 
He met with advisors and was briefed on different possible systems, but in the end he chose 
the Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV).236 There are both supporters and critics of SNTV, 
and both make legitimate arguments regarding the benefits and problems associated with this 
type of electoral system. Since the implementation of SNTV, it appears, at least so far, that 
the critics were correct. The problems that first occurred in the 2005 Parliamentary 
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Elections—the first time SNTV was used in Afghanistan—have as of yet gone unresolved, 
and instead appear to either remain or grow worse with each subsequent election. The 
perceived benefits of this system include its simplicity for casting and counting ballots, the 
apparent direct link it provides between voters and representatives, and its marginalization of 
political parties.237 Because an electoral system needed to be implemented almost 
immediately following Karzai’s inauguration, simplicity was key. The Afghan government 
would have to not only insert this new system into Afghan politics without any trial period, 
but they would also have to disseminate and explain it to a population of nearly 31 million 
people, out of which only 28.1% are even literate.238 In terms of popular opinion, much of the 
Afghan population favored a system that would downplay or eliminate political parties so 
that independent or unknown candidates could have the chance to gain office. However, the 
characteristics of Afghanistan, its society, and its political system appear to have perverted 
the potential benefits of SNTV into serious impediments.  
When there are a lot of candidates and a lot of voters, as there are in Afghanistan, the 
Single Non-Transferable Voting system grows much more complex and difficult to monitor. 
Electoral systems can often be as important, if not more important, than the intentions of the 
voters, and that has proven true with the SNTV.239 This system incentivizes and rewards 
fraud, corruption, intimidation, and vote buying because of how easy it is to affect the 
outcome of elections simply by buying only a small number of votes to advance ahead of the 
competition.240 Furthermore, the lottery effect SNTV creates means that the last few 
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candidates who are elected on a big ballot are almost a tossup, because there is a very small 
difference between the number of votes some losing and winning candidates receive. In order 
to secure more votes then, SNTV has also exaggerated clientelism, encouraging the exchange 
of goods and services for political support.241 Additionally, particularly in Afghanistan where 
there are so many candidates on the ballot, the last few candidates who win do not receive a 
majority of the votes, let alone a reasonable percentage to legitimize their victory. For 
example, in 2005 a candidate for a seat in the Wolesi Jirga won with less than one percent of 
the vote, meaning that candidate surely cannot be deemed as adequately representative of his 
community.242  
SNTV also creates a system in which voters vote for a candidate rather than a party. 
This holds candidates accountable to their constituencies and doesn’t let them ride the 
coattails of their party. While this can be positive, it has in fact meant that candidates cannot 
be held responsible to a party for their actions or votes, nor can a voter easily predict along 
which lines a candidate will typically vote. Also, without the economic or organizational 
support of a party, it is harder for unknown candidates to raise enough support and/or capital 
to be elected.243 This then completely contradicts the claims of SNTV’s supporters that 
independent candidates, including unknown ones, are advantaged when there are no party 
lists or powerful political entities. This system not only generates a larger number of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
241 Reynolds, Andrew, and John Carey. "Fixing Afghanistan's Electoral System." Afghanistan 
Research and Evaluation Unit Briefing Paper Series, July 2012. 
http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/1211E-
Fixing%20Afghanistans%20Electoral%20System%20BP%202012.pdf. Pg. 17. 
242 "Primer on the Single Non-Transferable Vote System."  
243 "Primer on the Single Non-Transferable Vote System." 
77 
candidates, increasing the complexity of elections, but also means that only those political 
elites who are “sufficiently disciplined and organized” can take advantage of SNTV.244 
Another problem associated with SNTV is its tendency to result in thousands of 
wasted votes. A wasted ballot is one in which the voter has “wasted” his or her vote on a 
losing candidate. Because voters do not get to rank their preferences for candidates, their 
votes are thrown out if they didn't select one of the winning candidates.245 That in turn 
guarantees the formation of an unrepresentative legislature. Because most voters end up 
dispersing their votes amongst the various losing candidates, those candidates who do win 
are elected with very small percentages of the vote. As compared to a single-member district 
where a candidate needs to win the majority of votes to be elected, using SNTV to elect 
multimember districts results in the election of candidates who are not representative all of, 
the majority of, or even a decent amount of the people they are supposedly beholden to.246  
SNTV has also provided for huge numbers of spoiled ballots; for example, in the 
2005 legislative elections, approximately 68 percent of the votes were wasted and 5 percent 
were spoiled.247 The high illiteracy rates in Afghanistan were responsible for the numerous 
instances of spoiled ballots, because voters had a hard time understanding the process or 
filling out a ballot correctly. This, paired with the system of giving every candidate a symbol, 
in which many candidates have multiple symbols that are also used by other candidates in the 
same election, led to the high number of spoiled ballots.248 It also leads to a high degree of 
fragmentation and competition in the legislature because it is extremely individualistic for 
candidates and officials; this, in turn, only serves to further strengthen the executive at the 
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cost of the legislature.249 In conclusion, SNTV has made the elections incredibly difficult to 
run, while also delegitimizing the outcomes and creating a government rife with corruption.
  
 
2005 Legislative Elections 
 
 The 2005 parliamentary elections, also agreed upon in the 2001 Bonn Agreement, 
were the first parliamentary elections held in Afghanistan in over three decades.250 
Projections for these elections included improved polling station safety, decreased corruption 
and vote buying, and increased participation; however, none of these projections were 
realized in actuality. Voter turnout was significantly lower than the 2004 presidential 
elections, at approximately 50% of registered voters participating.251 Initially, the elections 
were supposed to be held in 2004 as well, but they had to be postponed because of security 
concerns; however, this did very little to alleviate any of the risk of violence. Even before the 
elections took place, violence was a growing issue, and several candidates were murdered 
before the polling started.252 
Another huge problem, which continued from the 2004 presidential elections, was the 
lottery effect that surrounded voting. It is extremely problematic that the 34th person, who 
didn’t win, only needed to get 24 more votes to win a seat in the election. This reinforced and 
increased the incentives for corruption, vote buying, and ballot stuffing—it would not cost 
the 34th candidate very much to buy 24 more votes. Furthermore, on average 11.5 percent of 
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the vote was needed for the first seat in each province, but only 5.7 percent, and as little as 
0.5 percent in Kabul, was needed to win the last seat.253  
 Another significant problem in these elections was the amount of wasted votes. Many 
members elected to the Wolesi Jirga “were not supported by anywhere near a majority of 
Afghan voters,” and only two million, or 32 percent, “of all the votes cast were for winning 
candidates.”254 That means nearly two-thirds of all votes cast were wasted, an abnormally 
large amount compared to both new and old democracies. SNTV in Afghanistan has clearly 
impeded the normal translation of public support into actual representation. In comparison to 
Afghanistan’s levels, only 5 percent of the votes were wasted in the first Iraqi general 
elections, which also took place in 2005. Likewise, in South Africa’s first democratic 
elections in 1994, less than one percent of the votes were wasted.255  Moreover, SNTV 
created a disproportionate allocation of votes to seats, which greatly fragmented the 
parliament. This was clearly evidenced in the 2005 elections, when the largest group from the 
interim Afghan parliament only received 25 seats out of 249 altogether, or about 10 percent. 
The rest of the seats were divided among forty different groups, and all but three provinces 
had the majority of their votes go to losing candidates.256 The extremely high level of wasted 
votes and the fragmentation of the legislature in Afghanistan should be seen not only as a 
consequence of SNTV, but also as a consequence of the lack of security or stability in the 
country, the presence of the Taliban, and the widespread prevalence of corruption. 
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Fraud was still rampant, and the results had to be delayed for over a month because of 
the fraud allegations that surrounded the 2005 elections.257 Former warlords and their 
followers gained a majority of the seats in both the lower house and provincial council, 
perpetuating the opaque, corrupt nature of the government. Lastly, there were issues with the 
ink used to identify who had and had not voted. Instead, some voters were able to cast a 
ballot, wash off the ink, and then cast another.258 This led to illegitimate results, because it 
gave some voters a greater say in the outcome than others had. While the 2005 parliamentary 
elections were fraught with numerous problems and nearly disastrous in term of democratic 
standards, there was one hugely successful aspect: women captured the constitutionally 
mandated 28% of lower house seats.259 Still, Afghanistan and its international partners 
looked ahead to the 2009 presidential elections, hoping that improvements in security and 
corruption could be made in time to elect a legitimate and democratic president. 
 
2009 Presidential Elections 
 
 Despite calls from the Taliban for the Afghan people to boycott the 2009 presidential 
elections and despite the organization’s ever-present threats to harm those who participated, 
the elections still took place on August 20. These elections, the first to be primarily organized 
by Afghan institutions, featured even worse problems than the previous elections. In an 
attempt to diminish the issues and corruption that had surrounded the previous two elections, 
President Karzai appointed an Independent Election Commission; however, the IEC “is 
viewed…as beholden to the executive branch,” because they are handpicked by Karzai.260 
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The elections were rife with fraud, even more so than in 2004, with ballot box stuffing as the 
most common method of fraud. After the initial elections on August 20, the Election 
Complaints Committee (ECC) announced it had found “clear and convincing evidence of 
fraud” in the 2009 elections and subsequently ordered the IEC to conduct an audit and 
recount the votes from specific polling stations.261 The findings from the audit process 
resulted in the exclusion of 19 percent of the votes cast in August, three-quarters of which 
were cast for President Karzai and ruled invalid.262 The areas with significant electoral 
irregularities—the south, southeast, and east—tended to be the least secure, which in turn 
made it harder to observe fraud and easier to perpetrate it.  
Additionally, voter turnout remained extremely low, with just about 50 percent of the 
population registered to vote, and only 38 percent that actually voted. Of the 15.6 million 
registered voters, somewhere between 35 and 38 percent were women.263 While this rate is a 
testament to an improvement in women’s rights and participation, these numbers must grow 
for election results to be seen as legitimately representing what the majority of the Afghan 
people want. Also, the Taliban and other militant groups have repeatedly targeted female 
voters and activists disproportionately for their participation in the elections. It is important 
to increase and ensure their security throughout the voting process as a means of improving 
the process of democratization and its likelihood of success, as well as to display a 
commitment to the constitutionally guaranteed gender equality. 
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It took nearly four months to get the final provincial council results due to the 
massive number of electoral complaints, 726 of which were categorized as serious “Priority 
A” complaints.264 Additionally, none of the presidential candidates received a majority of the 
votes, so runoff elections were scheduled for November 7, 2009, between President Karzai 
and Abdullah Abdullah; however, Abdullah withdrew just six days before the runoff 
elections, because he felt that the initial fraud in the elections had not been adequately 
addressed or combatted. Thus, Karzai was subsequently declared the winner, although he did 
not receive a majority of the votes.265 Surrounded by allegations of fraud and accusations of 
illegitimacy, Karzai began his second term on rocky ground. This was only reinforced by 
parliament’s rejection of two-thirds of Karzai’s cabinet picks in January 2010.266  
Leading up to the elections, the International Security Assistance Force in 
Afghanistan said that insurgent attacks had severely increased. Attacks had decreased to the 
single digits or teens in the previous months; however, in the weeks and days leading up to 
the election, attacks grew first to 32 per day and then jumped to 48 attacks the day before the 
election.267 Security was likely the biggest problem for this election, because it kept many 
voters at home on Election Day and likely intimidated some others to choose a different 
candidate than they would have sans violence. This also factored into the election of at least 
70 candidates to provincial councils who had ties to illegal armed groups. These leaders were 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
264 Ibid. Pg. 98. 
265 Ibid. Pg. 102. 
266 Shalizi, Hamid, and Emma Graham-Harrison. "Afghan MPs Reject Two-thirds of Karzai's 
Cabinet." Reuters. January 02, 2010. http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/01/02/us-afghanistan-
cabinet-vote-idUSTRE6010MQ20100102.  
267 "The 2009 Presidential and Provincial Council Elections in Afghanistan." 
83 
able to bypass election laws by registering their militias as private security companies.268 
With their election, the government ushered in a largely corrupt parliament full of warlords. 
This was only buoyed by Karzai’s administration, which was comprised of two vice 
presidents alleged to have committed huge human rights violations in the past.269  
Various international organizations and governments recognized and issued concerns 
regarding the 2009 presidential elections; they urged Afghanistan, its electoral commissions, 
and the international community to address the electoral flaws “in order to build greater 
confidence in the integrity of future elections.”270 However, there is one shining beacon of 
hope that arose from these elections. Despite the growing insurgency, increased violence, and 
continued threats issued by the Taliban and other groups, Afghans still came out to cast 4.8 
millions votes.271 This is an extremely significant display of the dedication to democracy and 
democratization a large portion of Afghans possess—millions of Afghan citizens risked their 
lives just to vote in a presidential election, in spite of the current system that is extremely 
flawed. Thus, even though there are still a multitude of problems and even though the 
elections aren’t close to free or fair, there is hope for the future that the people of Afghanistan 
have time and again chosen to pursue democracy. 
 
2010 Legislative Elections 
 
 In 2010, hopes were extremely high that Afghanistan would have improved the 
election process after three hugely flawed elections; however, it was evident after Election 
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Day that Afghanistan still had a long way to go and a lot of changes and improvements to 
make before they could achieve truly free and fair elections. In fact, the quality of freeness 
and fairness reached an all time low in the September 18, 2010, elections, with a sharp 
decline in “legal framework, electoral management, voter education, voter registration, 
campaign regulation, polling itself, and election complaints.”272 First, however, I will 
enumerate the advancements and improvements Afghanistan made and attempted to make 
for these elections. Out of the 2,500 candidates competing for 249 seats, 400 were women.273 
In preparation for the elections, the government appointed a new IEC chair and chief 
electoral officer, who together instituted multiple measures to help reduce or mitigate fraud, 
which appeared to be relatively effective. They finalized and released the list of polling sites 
a month before the election date, as compared to previous years when polling lists were 
finalized just days in advance.274 In a direct attack on fraud, the IEC blacklisted over 6,000 
polling officials who had been suspected of engaging in fraud during the 2009 elections. 
They decided to rotate various provincial and district polling officials in an attempt to 
prevent pressure from local networks. Finally, they abolished the ability to transfer ballots 
between sites and assigned unique serial numbers to packages of ballots.275  
While simply instituting such practices was a huge improvement from previous 
elections, the 2010 Wolesi Jirga elections were still extremely marred by problems dating 
back to 2004. For example, the IEC decided to close some polling stations at the very last 
minute due to security concerns; however, they failed to publicize that, so many voters had to 
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search for a new polling site or were unable to vote.276 The ECC decided to decentralize its 
authority to the provincial level, which made it harder to coordinate and recruit officials, 
respond to complaints, or publicize their decisions. Fraud, ballot stuffing, and voter 
intimidation were still widespread, and the IEC audit resulted in the invalidation of over 1.5 
million votes, or 25 percent.277 The ECC investigation also resulted in the disqualification of 
several winning candidates; however, many complained these investigations seriously lacked 
transparency. Furthermore, although many candidates were widely suspected of having ties 
to militias, only 36 were disqualified for this reason; this did little to appease human rights 
organizations, such as the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, because “the net 
caught a few small fish while the sharks swam around it.”278 After all of the ballots were cast, 
the government was held in limbo for several months until August 2011, when the IEC 
changed the results. They stripped nine members of parliament of their seats and reinstated 
nine candidates who had been disqualified earlier by the ECC. To many, this was a clear 
display of the IEC, appointed by President Karzai, intervening and interrupting the 
democratic process so that Karzai and his cronies could maintain power.279 
 
2014 Presidential Elections 
 
The most recent Afghan elections took place on April 5, 2014, with eleven 
candidates, 12 million voters, and over 6,000 voting sites.280 The importance of this election 
cannot be understated—it paved the way for the country’s first-ever peaceful democratic 
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transfer of power from Hamid Karzai, the first Afghan president, to a new candidate. After 
the first round of elections in April, runoff elections were held on June 14 between Ashraf 
Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah. Ghani, who originally received far less votes than Abdullah in 
the first round, came out on top with 56 percent of the votes; however, Abdullah protested 
the results and accused the IEC and other election officials of widespread fraud.281 
Subsequently, a political stalemate ensued, as both sides refused to back down or accept 
defeat. The United Nations performed an audit and declared that fraud on both sides made 
little change to the outcome. After this announcement, Abdullah and Ghani finally agreed to 
sign a power-sharing deal on September 21, in which Ghani will be president and Abdullah 
will be chief executive officer of the National Unity Government.282 This new position of 
CEO requires a change to the constitution that will be confirmed within the next two years; 
however, many feel the deal is usurping the democratic process in order to appease both 
candidates.283  
Since the 2014 elections, Freedom House has reported on the quality of freeness and 
fairness in Afghanistan, and it is alarming. In the past year, there was a downward trend for 
the Afghan freedom rating, largely due to the deterioration of security that has been a 
consequence of the NATO troop drawdown.284 Since 2013, Afghan security forces have 
suffered an increased number of combat deaths, which should be seen as directly correlated 
with the drawdown and departure of international troops. This suggests that the various 
Afghan security apparatuses are ill prepared and ill equipped to assume responsibility of 
combat operations by themselves. In addition to a lagging military and police force, 
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Afghanistan is still receiving extremely low scores for its electoral process (3 out of 12), the 
functioning of its government (2 out of 12), the pervasiveness of corruption (175th out of 177 
countries on Transparency International’s 2013 Corruption Perceptions Index), and the 
quality of civil liberties (15 out of 60).285 This is a clear indicator that the looming loss of 
significant U.S. troops has already and is continuing to have negative effects on Afghan 
society; however, this is also an indicator that international presence so far has not been 




While there have been attempts at improvement, Afghanistan’s electoral system is 
still in dire need of comprehensive reform. The United States and other international partners 
can and should assist in this reform, but it must be Afghan-led, for it is the Afghan people 
who will chose whether or not to legitimately participate in the electoral process. Many of the 
problems that were plaguing Afghanistan in the 2010 elections are ones that have been 
repeatedly documented, both by domestic and international observers, in the 2004, 2005, and 
2009 elections, yet they remain unaddressed.286  
In looking ahead, the 2015 Parliamentary elections are the next opportunity for 
Afghanistan and the international community to improve and fix the flaws in the electoral 
system; however, there may already be issues surrounding these next elections. The 
constitution stipulates that the next parliamentary elections must be held before June 2015.287 
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Unfortunately, because the 2014 presidential elections took so long, this may not be feasible. 
President Ghani has announced that he is committed to meeting this deadline, but it is unclear 
whether or not the necessary institutions, workers, funding, and candidates can all be ready in 
time. Ghani’s options are either to delay the elections, which would require Afghanistan to 
bend the constitution again, or to hold the elections on time, albeit unprepared and without 
the necessary reform.288 President Ghani’s and the National Assembly’s decision on these 
elections will serve as a way to gauge this new administration’s commitment to the 
constitution, as well as to improving the freeness and fairness of its elections.  
If the parliamentary elections do take place before the deadline, the failures and 
potential successes such elections tend to expose will be helpful in creating and 
implementing electoral reform for the next elections. Although legitimate, secure, fair 
elections have thus far evaded Afghanistan, the Afghan people, the United States and the 
international community must remain diligent—success after such drastic change does not 
happen overnight, but requires time, experience, practice, and a willingness to fail. Finally, 
reforming, improving, and legitimizing Afghan elections is just as crucial to the stability of 
Afghanistan as battlefield victories against the insurgency are—this will require the U.S. and 
other countries to remain as committed to fixing the electoral system and government 













In judging the success or failure of the international mission in Afghanistan, it is 
important to acknowledge that, despite popular belief, democracy is not one-size-fits-all; for 
example, democratization plans created for Iraq cannot simply be adopted in Afghanistan 
without adjustment. If U.S. policymakers can accept this, then perhaps we can stop blaming 
the failures and shortcomings of the American mission in Afghanistan on Afghanistan, its 
history, its people, and the Taliban. While each of these has proved a veritable opponent and 
impediment to democracy, the United State must accept its share of the blame and 
responsibility. Afghanistan may be considered the graveyard of empires, but in this case it 
seems the United States may have helped dig its own grave. Military effort here wasn't the 
issue; U.S. and NATO troops swiftly achieved military victory over the Taliban and other 
insurgencies. Where the U.S. fell short was in its reconstruction efforts in the aftermath of 
military victory. Consequently, after nearly fourteen years in Afghanistan, the United States 
is preparing to leave the country in a state of disarray, confusion, and ever increasing 
violence, with threats to the government, democracy, and nation multiplying rather than 
diminishing.  
 As the U.S. troop withdrawal approaches, it appears less and less likely that the U.S. 
will remain engaged enough to continue propping up the Afghan government and creating 
and maintaining a functioning electoral system. Earlier this month, President Obama 
announced that the United States would hold off on the massive withdrawal of troops for the 
time being, which will at least keep the Taliban at bay and this pseudo-democracy alive a tad 
longer; however, the U.S. cannot stay forever, and it is unclear if Afghanistan can ever be 
completely politically, economically, and militarily independent. Once U.S. troops withdraw 
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entirely, it is possible that the Afghan government will fall only to be replaced by the 
Taliban. If the Taliban cannot assume power, then it is likely that a renewed civil war will 
begin.289 While these are just potential outcomes, it is almost certain that violence and 
terrorism will increase once American troops exit, threatening the continuation of the 
democratization process. Post-2014 predictions suggest that the Taliban will continue to find 
sanctuary to regenerate in Pakistan, then intensify pressure on Afghan forces in rural and 
border areas, expand control in areas vacated by ANSF and U.S. troops, encircle key cities, 
and conduct high profile attacks.290 Other reports suggest that factional militias will rise and 
reorganize to counter the Taliban, which would be helpful in keeping the Taliban out of 
power but could also trigger wider ethnic and communal conflict in the country.291  
With these grim predictions of an immediate decrease in security and an immediate 
increase in violence, it is important to consider if resolution with the Taliban can be achieved 
and if the American policy of democracy promotion can be successful. Afghanistan, NATO, 
and the U.S. have most likely surpassed the point where outlasting or destroying the Taliban 
is feasible. This is both because international resolve has diminished, and because the 
Taliban, which has been alive for nearly eighteen years, has run laps around the five-year 
mark when a terrorist group is still weak enough for the government to likely achieve total 
victory.292 Particularly following U.S. withdrawal, ANSF will not only be incapable of 
utterly defeating the Taliban, but will also struggle just to prevent any further Taliban gains. 
A realistic alternative then is to end the conflict with a negotiated settlement, and the sooner 
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it is done, the more favorable it will be to Afghan and American interests. However, the 
commitment problems on all sides of this conflict have so far prevented a negotiation from 
happening and may continue to do so. While the U.S. departure may give Ghani and the 
Afghan government the push it needs to negotiate with the Taliban, the U.S. withdrawal may 
just as likely take negotiations off the table for the Taliban as it gains influence. It is also 
important to include Pakistan—if Pakistan cannot be neutralized as a state sponsor of 
terrorism, the Taliban can never be held to complete compliance with any deal.  
A Taliban victory over the Afghan government would mean a total defeat of 
democracy in Afghanistan. Although negotiations with the Taliban are not preferable, it 
seems they may be the only remaining option to keep the hopes of Afghan democracy alive. 
The parameters of a potential settlement include: granting the Taliban legal status as a 
political party and incorporating it into the government once it disarms and renounces 
violence; allowing the government to preserve its constitution and general structure; forcing 
Pakistan to stop funding the Taliban; creating a strong, stable border with Pakistan; and, 
calling for complete U.S. withdrawal from the country.293  
However, these outcomes are far from ideal or acceptable to the U.S., which has 
incurred such high costs throughout the conflict. Perhaps it should be seen as a success rather 
than a failure that U.S. involvement has hindered possible negotiation between the Afghan 
government and the Taliban in the past. Maybe the U.S. should consider the past thirteen 
years of moral hazard successful—without it, the Afghan government likely would have 
fallen to the Taliban or negotiated a settlement unfavorable to the U.S.  
Unfortunately, the Taliban will not be the only remaining threat or impediment to the 
success and survival of democracy in Afghanistan. The nature of the American intervention 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
293 Biddle, Stephen. 
92 
has likely worsened the conflict and served as a bulwark against our very own efforts at 
democratization. Particularly because the U.S. entered as a foreign occupying force 
unwelcomed by the Taliban and unfriendly to Islam, the American presence was met with 
increasing terrorist attacks, both against the ISAF forces, as well as any Afghans who 
collaborated with Westerners. This hindered operations in the country and limited the 
possible intelligence ISAF could gain, making both the War on Terror and the reconstruction 
efforts more difficult. 
Finally, ISAF failed to win the hearts and minds of Afghans in contested towns on the 
Pakistan border, which allowed the Taliban to gain favor and control in many of these 
areas.294 Instead of deescalating the conflict, perhaps U.S. and NATO presence has done 
more harm than good, prolonging the life of an inefficient Afghanistan and postponing its 
inevitable failure, without bringing about an end to the war.295 Additionally, the aid provided 
by the U.S. to both Afghanistan and Pakistan created perverse incentives for the governments 
of each country; each government was repeatedly economically rewarded when they failed to 
defeat the Taliban, so they instead pursued a strategy of maintaining the status quo. 
For democracy to survive, thrive, and gain legitimacy in Afghanistan, multiple things 
must happen. First, it has to come organically from the Afghan people. Anything imposed by 
foreign governments—elections, a constitution, even a voting system—lose a lot of 
legitimacy simply due to their association with the U.S. or the West. There may be hope for 
this yet, once the U.S. withdraws from Afghanistan, as evidenced by the millions of voters 
participating in elections year after year, despite the security concerns, the fraud and 
corruption, and the flawed electoral system. This organic democracy should also feature a 
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different electoral system that can better represent so many different groups of people. As 
mentioned above, a negotiation with the Taliban, allowing moderate and disarmed members 
to join the government, may be the only way to eliminate their threat to democracy. Whether 
or not the Taliban will negotiate is a different story, but it may be worth a shot. Finally, 
Afghanistan needs to focus more resources and effort on improving healthcare, the education 
system, and the standard of living. Creating a literate, educated, healthy, and happy 
population will decrease anger towards the government and hopefully increase its popularity 
and its support. 
Lastly, it is time to confront the American policy of democracy promotion and its 
viability in future foreign relations. In modern history, no idea “holds more sway in the 
minds of educated Americans than the belief that it is possible to democratize governments 
anytime, anywhere, and under any circumstances.”296 However, this belief is largely 
unsubstantiated by any U.S. foreign interventions or attempts at democratization.  It is vain 
and self-aggrandizing to assume that every nation or every population wants to live under 
democratic rule. George Kennan argues, “Democracy, as Americans understand it, is not 
necessarily the future of all mankind, nor is it the duty of the U.S. government to assure that 
it becomes that.”297 Aside from this incorrect assumption, democratization has also served as 
an afterthought or an excuse to rationalize U.S. interventions that otherwise would have been 
deemed illegitimate or even illegal.  
Furthermore, the very actions the United States has taken in an effort to promote 
democracy abroad actually tend to contradict democracy, values, and ideals at home. 
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Western style democracy is not transferable to every country in every corner of the world. 
Systems and styles of government should be tailored to the population they are governing, 
rather than designed and implemented by outsiders. While some type of democracy has the 
potential, although how much potential is still debatable, to take root and eventually succeed 
in Afghanistan, it will not be Western-style democracy, nor will it be a democracy propped 
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